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This paper focuses on a very original and peculiar peacebuilding experience – the Peace 
Laboratory of Magdalena Medio. Based on the civil society and located in a highly 
conflictual region of Colombia, it represents a peacebuilding from below initiative with 
the political and financial support of the European Union. The Peace Laboratory seeks 
new paths to peace and development and an alternative model of peacebuilding, in a 
country which desperately needs new and imaginative solutions and formulas to peace. 
Above  all,  what  is at  stake  is to  question  if  the  Peace  Laboratory  is  a  real “peace 
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2.  Introduction:  
 
 
In  a  country  involved  in  an  enduring  intractable  conflict,  Colombia  has 
experienced in the last years several local peacebuilding activities. Based on the civil 
society, these have been an alternative to the national negotiations with the guerrillas, 
facing harsh difficulties and provoking high social and political frustrations.  
Some  of  the  most  interesting,  ambitious  and  groundbreaking  of  these 
peacebuilding experiences are the so-called Peace Laboratories.  Located in a group of 
highly conflictual and violent regions, they constitute a joint attempt of the European 
Union  (EU),  the  Colombian  government  and  a  number  of  Colombian  social 
organisations to address the structural causes of the conflict in a local level.  
In this paper we will focus on the Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio, the 
first and original Peace Laboratory. We will examine and assess its potential in terms of 
conflict  resolution  within  the  regional  and  national  Colombian  framework.  The 
objective is to investigate the model of peace it conveys and if it corresponds to an 
alternative form of peacebuilding. To some extent, what is at stake is to question if the 
Peace Laboratory is a real “peace laboratory” and where is it heading for. This will 
include an analysis of its concept, its objectives, its hypothesis and dimensions. Among 
its actors, mainly the role of the EU within the process will be studied, and framed 
within the EU’s peace and development aid policies. Its regional and historical context 
and its micro and macro level impact will be other aspects of the analysis.  
This paper had, as preliminary work, not only bibliographic research and official 
documents  analysis,  but  also  some  fieldwork  in  the  region
2.  It  sustains  mainly  on 
interviews, both in Barrancabermeja and Bogotá, with Peace Laboratory and PDPMM
3 
former  and  current  workers  and  beneficiary  social  organizations.  Also  particularly 
relevant and important for the research was the visit to a Humanitarian Space, one of the 
most interesting Peace Laboratory’s projects. This occurred on May 2007 to the village 
of Tiquisio.   
                                                
2 I would like to thank all the people who were kindly available for the interviews and so helpful for this 
research. My special thanks to Marco Fidel Vargas, from CINEP, for having facilitated and given so 
much help in the fieldwork in the region.   
3  Peace  and  Development  Programme  of  Magdalena  Medio  (Programa  de  Desarrollo  y  Paz  del 
Magdalena Medio) 
   3 
This  paper  also  constitutes  the  first  of  two  regional  Colombian  case-studies 
papers involving Peace Laboratories, being the other Cauca-Nariño. 
 
 
2.2. The Magdalena Medio Region: 
 
 
Magdalena Medio is a region located in the northeast of Colombia, with its axis 
on the river Magdalena
4. It doesn’t constitute an administrative region. It is composed 
by 4 departments – Santander, Bolívar, Cesar and Antioquia
5, and by 27 counties. It is 
mainly  a  rural  area,  with  only  two  important  urban  centres  –  Barrancabermeja  and 
Aguachica  (Rudqvist  and  Van  Sluys,  2005:  2).  It  has  a  population  of  800.000 
inhabitants (OPI, 2006: 8) and an area of 30.000 km² (CDPMM, 2001: 4). 
It is a strategically important region in Colombia from the military and economic 
point of view. It is characterized by an abundance of natural resources, which include 
gold, emeralds, woods, tropical goods and specially oil. Colombia’s most important 
refinery is located in Barrancabermeja. It is also a vital corridor for the drug and trade 
routes. It represents a point of confluence between the Atlantic and the Pacific coast of 
Colombia and Venezuela (Katz, 2004: 30). 
However,  this  richness  of  the  region,  in  terms  of  resources  and  income 
generation
6, is contrasted by the poor panorama of the population and by the general 
underdevelopment  of  the  region.  The  Magdalena  Medio’s  model  of  development, 
centred on oil and extraction of natural resources for exportation, hasn’t benefited the 
most of its population. The income generated by these economic activities leaves the 
region, creating low profit for the local inhabitants. There are deep social inequalities in 
Magdalena Medio and a high concentration of capital and land. Poverty and inequality 
have become a structural feature of Magdalena Medio. 70% of the population is poor, a 
number well above the national average. But there are even more critical cases in the 
region, such as Rio Viejo, where the percentage goes up to 90% (Katz, 2004: 30). There 
is a generalized lack of public services, facilities, schooling, health, employment and 
land (CDPMM, 2001: 5). The unequal distribution of land has, in fact, been one of the 
major  issues  and  problems  in  Magdalena  Medio.  It  is  one  of  the  most  visible  and 
problematic faces of poverty in the region and a historical cause of social struggle and 
armed conflict
7. This trend has even experienced an increase in the last 30 years, due to 
the true “counter agrarian reform” which the paramilitary and extensive cattle farming 
expansion have instituted.  
This  economic  scenario  has  pushed  many  peasants  to  the  illegal  economy, 
specifically  to  the  coca  growing.  Though  Magdalena  Medio  isn’t  a  region  of  high 
production of coca leaf, it has important plantations in the south of Bolivar, with close 
links  to  the  paramilitaries.  The  armed  conflict  has  increased  much  the  coca  leaf 
production in the region. It is supposed to correspond to, at this time, between fifteen 
                                                
4 Vide attachment nº 1 
5 Vide attachment nº 2 
6 The regional internal income is around 2600 million USD, 67% of which is generated by the oil refinery 
in Barrancabermeja (De Roux, 2001). 
 
7 The ELN has historically mobilized against a process of land concentration in the region, characterized 
by the dismantling of the peasant colonization and transfer of land to the great land owners (Bergquist et 
al, 1992)   4 
and eighteen hectares (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 14). This has brought to the region a 
fumigation per year since 2000, due to Plan Colombia (Guerra, 2007).  
Historically,  Magdalena  Medio  has  been  an  internal  colonization  frontier, 
remaining a peripheral region, with a weak and precarious presence of the state, both 
physically and in terms of social and public services (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 
15).  The  territorial  occupation  of  Magdalena  Medio  has  never  been  followed  by  a 
presence of the state which fulfilled its role of territorial balance and social regulation 
and cohesion (Katz, 2004: 31). On the contrary, the state presence has been highly 
repressive and militarized, represented almost only by the army.  
Therefore, much of this political space left by the state has been fulfilled by 
insurgent and counter-insurgent groups. Both the ELN
8 and the AUC
9 were born in 
Magdalena  Medio.  This  is  quite  symptomatic  of  the  importance  of  this  region.  It 
corresponds to a zone disputed by both guerrillas and paramilitaries. It is considered a 
“zona roja”, a hot spot. All armed actors are present in the region. The ELN, the FARC, 
the EPL
10, and six battalions of the National Army are in Magdalena Medio (De Roux, 
2001). Historically a zone of influence of the ELN
11 (Bergquist et al, 1992), it witnessed 
the political and military emergence and domination of paramilitarism in the 90s and 
especially in the 2000s, which diminished the influence of the guerrillas until nowadays. 
The AUC managed to control all headland municipalities of Magdalena Medio, forcing 
the  ELN  to  “take  refugee” in  the  Serrania  de San  Lucas  and  the  FARC  in  central 
Magdalena Medio (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 14).  This increased the violence in the 
region  and  inaugurated  a  new  era  of  social  terror,  selective  murders,  internal 
displacement
12 and humanitarian emergence (Katz, 2003: 31).  
All  this  configures  a  scenario  of  high  intensity  of  violence.  The  political 
homicide rate is very high in Magdalena Medio comparing to other regions of Colombia 
and to the national average
13 (OPI: 2006, 19). The process of demobilization of the 
paramilitary hasn’t diminished much either the violence in the region. A paramilitary 
control has remained in several areas and a new generation of paramilitary groups, such 
as the Aguilas Negras and Manos Negras, has appeared (Ibidem, 24).  
Notwithstanding,  it  is  a  region  with  a  strong  historical  background  of social 
mobilization, which covers all twentieth century. The oil industry in Magdalena Medio 
allowed  a  strong  proletarian  organization  to  flourish.  Not  only  labor  struggles  and 
strikes were common, but also peasant struggles for land and a general social and civic 
mobilization  for  public  services,  demanding  what  an  absent  state  didn’t  or  poorly 
provided to the population and to the region (OPI, 2006: 59). An important example of 
this was the marchas campesinas of the eighties, claiming not only for land, but for the 
right to life,  the  demilitarization of the peasant  zones,  basic  public services for the 
population and the protection of the national resources (Velásquez, 1992: 275).  
 
   
2.3. The origins of the Peace Laboratory:  
                                                
8 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) 
9 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (Self Defence Units of Colombia) 
10 Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army) 
11  The  ELN  consolidated  historically  in  Magdalena  Medio,  especially  around  the  oil  enclave  of 
Barrancabermeja. During the eighties it specialized in oil pipelines sabotage and kidnapping of foreign 
company  executives.  Progressively,  it  lost  much  of  its  influence  and  territory  to  the  FARC  and, 
particularly, to the Paramilitaries (Bergquist et al, 1992: 317)  
12    Between 1991 and 2002 more than 40.000 people were displaced in the region. (Katz, 2004: 31) 
13 According to the Observatório de Paz Integral (2006: 13, 14) Magdalena Medio has had 1730 political 
homicides from 1996 to 2004.    5 
 
 
A number of trends and factors cross in the origin of the Peace Laboratories. 
Firstly,  one  must  emphasize  that  Colombia  has  seen  in  the  last  twenty  years  the 
emergence  of  several  civil  initiatives  of  peace  and  civil  resistance,  such  as  the 
Comunidades de Paz, the ATCC
14, Justapaz, or the Mandato Ciudadano para la Paz, 
Vida y Libertad. 
One of the most ambitious and original of these initiatives would be at the base 
of  the  creation  of  the  Peace  Laboratory  –  the  Programa  de  Desarollo  y  Paz  del 
Magdalena Medio (PDPMM). Created in 1995, it was originated by a shared concern of 
the Ecopetrol oil company, its labour union USO
15 and the Diocese of Barrancabermeja 
on the reasons why so rich a region had so much poverty and violence and what could 
be done, after fifty years creating income in Magdalena Medio, so that oil could be a 
real factor of development and peace in the region (Soto, 2007). This concern motivated 
a diagnose report to be asked to CINEP
16 and SEAP
17 on the causes of violence and 
poverty in the region and possible solutions and paths to it.  The report was a wide, open 
and  highly  participative  process,  which  involved  more  than  1500  people  and 
workgroups  on  all  the  region’s  municipalities  (Valderrama,  2007).  The  report’s 
conclusions  suggested  the  creation  of  a  peace  and  development  programme  which 
would promote dynamics of peace and development in the region.  The idea blossomed. 
The project and proposal of a peace and development programme was presented 
to  the  World  Bank  for  financing.  The  World  Bank  decided  to  support  the  process 
through a new instrument which at the moment was at its beginning – the Learning and 
Innovation Loan (LIL) (Arboleda, 2007). Two LIL credits of five million US Dollars 
were  granted,  being  the  Colombian  state  the  interlocutor.  Some  financing  was  also 
conceded by Ecopetrol, UN Agencies, and European NGOs and governments (Katz, 
2004: 33).  
This process would attract the attention of the European Union.  The EU got 
notice of the Programme and became interested in it. It realized it was an experience 
worth supporting. After some contacts and attending some meetings, the EU affirmed it 
wanted to collaborate in the process and support the experience. The idea of a “peace 
laboratory” based on the experience of the PDPMM was presented and accepted.  
Several reasons can explain this European interest and involvement: In fact, the 
EU  had started  to develop  peace-oriented  policies towards  Colombia in this  period. 
After the implementation of Plan Colombia, and the European refusal to take part in it, 
due to its military predominance, it was politically imperative for Europe to give a 
response to it and develop its own peace policies and approach to Colombia. The EU 
intended  to  differentiate  itself  from  the  North  American  plan  and  develop  its  own 
proposal, according to its own vision of conflict resolution in Colombia. The Peace 
Laboratory would become one of its core elements.  
Thus, the EU decided to create the Peace Laboratory based on the PDPMM after 
analyzing the opportunities it opened by the previous work it had done and fulfilled in 
the field and the previous experience managing international aid and structuring projects 
                                                
14 Asociación de Trabajadores y Campesinos de Carare (Association of Peasants and Workers of the 
Carare Region) 
15 Unión Sindical Obrera 
16 Centro de Investigación Nacional para la Educación Popular 
17 Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País   6 
of that staff. As Nicola Bertolini
18 (2007), former member of staff of the European 
Commission Delegation in Colombia, puts it:  
 
“Magdalena Medio had been supported for seven years before the arrival of the 
Peace Laboratory by the World Bank and the United Nations. This combination 
gave  us  a  certain  guarantee  of  an  installed  capacity  and  a  good  capacity  of 
analysis and intervention, which could receive numerous millions of euros of the 




The  possibility  of  peace  negotiations  between  the  Colombian  Pastrana 
government and the ELN in a demilitarized zone in the south of Bolivar, at the end of 
the nineties and beginning of this century, would also play an important role in this 
process and on the location of the Peace Laboratory in Magdalena Medio. The EU 
wanted to participate in the process and help supporting politically and financially the 
creation of this zone. At this time, European ambassadors paid visit to the region and 
spoke to the communities. The creation of the Peace Laboratory was therefore also an 
attempt of the EU to support a political negotiated solution to the conflict (Rudqvist and 
Van Sluys, 2005: 7). Even tough this zone would finally not be constituted, the EU still 
decided  to  structure  instruments  to  create  the  conditions  to  peace  in  the  region 
(Valderrama, 2007).  
But to understand the Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio, one has also to 
bear in mind and to take into account its historical and regional background.  It aroused 
in the mid-nineties in a difficult moment and context to the nation, in general, and to the 
region, in particular, characterized by economic recession, economic liberalization (with 
its  inherent  socials  costs),  and  an  increase  of  violence  and  of  the  armed  conflict 
intensity. This framework would underline a certain state failure and inability to face the 
crisis and would, against this background, give a boost to the civil society and push it to 
find alternatives. Numerous civil society peace initiatives were launched in this period 
in Colombia (Banfield et al., 2006: 58). 
But the Peace Laboratory also has its roots on a historical dynamic of popular 
and  social  mobilization  in  Magdalena  Medio.  The  PDPMM  benefited  from  an 
accumulated experience of civil resistance and social protest in the region, which had on 
the labour and peasant struggles and on organizations such as the USO and the OFP
20 
some of its more important expressions (Gutierrez, 2007).  
So, all these elements were important in the creation of the Peace Laboratory in 
Magdalena Medio, institutionalized in February 2002 by the signature by the EU and 
the Colombian government of a special financing convention. A period of eight years 
and  a  financial  package  of  42  million euros  were  previewed  for  the  Laboratory.  A 
second and a third Laboratories would be created later on in other regions of Colombia. 
 
2.4.  The  Peace  Laboratory  within  the  framework  of  EU’s  peace  and 
development aid policies:  
 
                                                
18 This is a personal view and does not reflect necessarily the European Commission position. 
19 “Magdalena Medio fue apoyada por siete años antes de la llegada del Laboratorio de Paz por el Banco 
Mundial y por Naciones Unidas. Esta combinación daba una cierta garantía de una capacidad instalada y 
una capacidad de análisis y de acción buena que pudiese recibir muchos millones de euros de la Unión 
Europea  […] y garantizar una eficiencia en la implementación de los programas” 
20 Organización Femenina Popular (Feminine Popular Organization)   7 
The Peace Laboratory, although corresponding mainly in its design and origin to 
a Colombian civil society initiative, reflects and can be framed within the EU’s peace 
and development aid policies.   
Historically a peace project for the European continent, the European Union has 
been setting the external projection of peace and stability as a main political concern 
and as a crucial element of its foreign policy and external relations. As recognised by 
the  European  Security  Strategy,  in  an  era  of  global  interdependence,  the  world’s 
insecurity  constitutes  Europe’s  insecurity.  Therefore,  Europe  has  been  developing 
peace-oriented policies, development and good governance for the rest of the world. It’s 
both a matter of idealism and realism (AAVV, 2004: 10). Although focusing primarily 
on its neighbouring area, these peace policies also cover many other different areas of 
the world, as the EU aims at playing a global role. Latin America is naturally part of it 
and Colombia one of its regional priorities in this context.  
These  European  peace  policies  configure  what  Stephan  Keukeleire  (2003) 
describes as a “structural diplomacy”. According to this author, the EU establishes a 
structural diplomacy in its relations and partnerships with the rest of the world, based on 
the promotion of long term structural changes in these regions and states. At stake is the 
support and “transfer” of the ideological governance principles which characterize the 
European  system,  such  as  democracy,  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  sustainable 
development. It is a diplomacy that transcends the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, including the three pillars and principally the communitarian policies ran by the 
European Commission. It is primarily based on the EU’s soft power instruments. 
Development  aid  plays a  large  role  in  this  dimension.  In fact, the  European 
development  policies  have  been  experiencing  a  political  reform  since  the  nineties. 
Above all, there has been a politization of the aid. Aid is no longer only centred on 
poverty reduction, but also on institutional building and political criteria. In this new aid 
context  and  configuration,  peacebuilding  has  become  a  very  important  aspect  of 
cooperation relations. The European Commission (2001: 10) argues that development 
aid represents the most powerful tool the EU has at its service to address the causes of 
conflict.  So,  elements  like  conflict  prevention,  conflict  resolution,  and  post-conflict 
peacebuilding were introduced in European development conventions, such as Lomé 
and Cotonou, and have become key aspects in the design of the aid programs.   
The Colombian case, and the Peace Laboratory in particular, configure a clear 
example of this European development aid framework oriented to peace and conflict 
resolution.  It  is  structured  for  and  according  to  the  specific  social  and  political 
conditions of conflict of the country. Therefore, it represents an innovative and original 
European  development approach  by  its  marked  orientation  towards  the  objective  of 




3. A “peace laboratory”?  
 
3.1. The Peace Laboratory’s objectives and philosophy:  
 
The Peace Laboratory has an ambitious program and multidimensional goals. 
But, clearly, its central guidelines are peace and development. It essentially intends to 
address  two  issues  –  the  high  level  of  violence  which  affects  mainly  the  civilian 
population and the high levels of poverty and exclusion (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 
27). Thus, the Peace Laboratory is sustained on two axes. That is quite evident in the   8 
name of the Programme itself, but also in its components, projects and philosophy. The 
Laboratory has an integral approach and departs from the theoretical assumption that 
both elements are related. It is based on the belief that peace is multidimensional and 
that in order to be sustainable, it must have a social, economic, political and cultural 
dimension.  
It intends essentially to build alternative models of peace and development at a 
local and regional level. It represents an attempt to create the social, economic and 
cultural conditions to peace at a grass roots level. What is at stake is fundamentally the 
construction  of  sustainable  peace,  through  the recovery  of  the  social  tissue  and  the 
attack  on  the  socioeconomic  and  cultural  conditions  which  sustain  and  cause  the 
conflict locally. The main objective of this experience lies thus in the elimination of the 
root causes of the conflict at a micro level.   
It  constitutes  an  attempt  to  find  and  build  alternative  paths  to  peace,  in  the 
middle of the conflict. It is an exploratory intent of peacebuilding, a “laboratory”. As 
Francisco de Roux (2005: 41), the director of the PDPMM puts it: “[it has in mind] to 
start to build regionally a process that shows that it is already possible in the middle of 
the conflict to find the alternative ways to live peacefully and with justice”.  
The Peace Laboratory rationale is that it is not reasonable to keep waiting for a 
national peace process to take place and to be successful. One can start right away to 
seek to build peace in the regions in conflict, by other means and with other instruments 
(De Roux, 2001). The Peace Laboratory does not intend to be a substitute to national 
negotiations with the armed actors. Nevertheless, its perspective is that civil society also 
has a role in peacebuilding.  
And this experience based on the civil society aims to have a demonstrative 
effect, to be a seed that can be transplanted, a process that can be replicated in other 
conflictual  zones  of  the  country.  It  intends  to  “show  viable  and  efficient  paths  for 
overcoming  the  conflict  which  could  be  applied  in  other  regions  of  Colombia” 
(PDPMM, 2007).  
This process sustains itself on a participative methodology. The Laboratory’s 
formula is based on the people. It proposes to launch and develop processes with the 
historically excluded sectors of the population and to encourage these sectors to help 
building alternative social, economic and political proposals (Herrera, 2007). It intends 
to be a highly participated process. It aims at making citizens see themselves as masters 
and  actors  of  its  own  fate,  to  develop  human  development  through  an  economy 
controlled by the population and to achieve peace through the reorganization of political 
life and citizen control of the public resources (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 4, 5).  
This participative and collective methodology sustains on the “núcleos de pobladores”, 
a  popular  space  of  participation  composed  by  the  local  social  organizations  of  a 
municipality,  whose  functions  are  the  definition  of  local  development  and  peace 
proposals and the execution of projects (Katz, 2004: 32).  
Therefore,  this  process  seeks  not  only  to  empower  and  give  expression  to 
invisiblelized and marginalized groups, as also to build a  social and  political actor, 
(Valderrama, 2007), one who acknowledges and defends its rights, who is favourable to 
peace and who takes part in public life with a new ethic, a democratic culture, a critical 
conscience and a capacity of participation. 
As  Libardo  Valderrama,  sub-director  of  the  PDPMM  asserts,  “The  Peace 
Laboratory does not intend to be an enterprise of projects. The projects are a means to 
build  peace  and  sustainable  development”
21.  A  peace  laboratory  is  not  a  wallet  to 
                                                
21 “El Laboratorio no se quiere como una empresa de proyectos. Los proyectos son un medio para llegar a 
la construcción de paz y al desarrollo sostenible”     9 
finance development projects. It is a social, economic and political process. The peace 
laboratory attempts to build collectively a new society (De Roux, 2001).    
The vision that sustains the Peace Laboratory is basically the creation of new 
forms of human relation through the perspective of non violence, dialogue and civil 
resistance (Pax Christi, 2006: 48). The logic of intervention is the implementation of a 
culture  of  peace,  based  on  dialogue  and  respect  for  human  rights,  democratic 
governance,  institutional  strengthening,  citizen  participation  and  sustainable 
development (European Commission, 2005: 20). This philosophy is summed up on the 
following principles: “Magdalena Medio should be built with all, with no exceptions”, 
“development  must  be  human,  sustainable  and  for  the  people”,  “life  first”, 
“empowerment of the people” and “creation of social networks”
22 (PDPMM, 2007). 
In fact, the Peace Laboratory is to a large amount an ethic proposal, with a 
strong utopian element in it. The Laboratory’s utopia is to show that another model of 
peace and development is possible, that structural changes are feasible and that there are 
alternative paths to conceive life, to structure economically and culturally the territory 
without exclusion, misery and fear. Nevertheless, it is a kind of utopia in practice, an 
utopia which structures itself in strategies and reflects itself in planning and precise 
projects (Vargas, 2007).  
 
 
3.2. The Peace Laboratory’s components:  
 
 
The Peace Laboratory configures, in its components, a wide and muldisciplinary 
range of projects, programmes and initiatives. It represents a macro-project. It focuses 
on several aspects and elements of development and peace.  It is based on an integral 
approach and on a broad concept of peace. 
In  its  original  plan  and  configuration,  the  Laboratory  of  Magdalena  Medio 
officially  structured  four  main  components  or  strategic  lines:  culture  of  peace  and 
integral rights, productive farming activities, social facilities and institutional building 
(Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005:  8). The first component aimed at “implementing a 
culture  of  peace  based on  the  strengthening  of  the  peace  dialogues,  the  respect  for 
human rights and a dignified life” (Aguilar, 2006: 48). Line 2 referred to economic and 
agricultural activities. It intended to support a regional peasant economy threatened in 
the  region  by  the  agro  industry  and  paramilitary  economic  projects,  and  to  build  a 
sustainable socio-economic development which will improve the life of the population 
in harmony with the environment. Line 3 seeked to address the region’s lack of basic 
public  services,  such  as  water  supply,  health,  sanitation  and  schools.  The  fourth 
component aimed at addressing one of the structural causes of the conflict, which is 
more  manifest  in  Magdalena  Medio,  the  precariousness  of  the  state  and  of  its 
institutions.  
In its second phase, launched in 2006, the strategic lines of the Peace Laboratory 
were  slightly  modified.  The  first  strategic  line  now  refers  to  “Peace  scenarios, 
concertation and human rights”. It intends to contribute to the consolidation of social 
and institutional dynamics which propitiate civil coexistence and the integral protection 
of  human  rights  in  the  conflict  scenarios  of  Magdalena  Medio,  through  the 
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strengthening of humanitarian spaces, design and execution of strategies of protection 
of vulnerable groups and support to the democratic institutions (PDPMM, 2007).  
The second line is composed by “Social, cultural and democratic governance 
processes”. It aims to potentiate social and political actors, in order to increment the 
democratic governance, by the means of strengthening civil society expressions and the 
transformation of the institutions at a local and regional level (Ibidem). 
Finally,  the  third  strategic  line  corresponds  to  “Productive  environmental 
processes  for  equity  and  sustainable  development”.  It  constitutes  a  strategy  of 
development and sustainability, which intends to mobilize Magdalena Medio towards a 
peace  economy,  focusing  primordially  on  its  traditionally  excluded  sectors.  It  is 
conceived as a process of generation of life with dignity and without exclusions carried 
out, by licit means, by the people and in harmony of gender and with nature (PDPMM, 
2007). 
These  components  configure  a  large  array  of  projects,  which  go  from 
educational  projects,  increase  of  productivity  programmes,  expansion  of  crop 
cultivation,  fishing,  mining  and  trade,  to  the  building  of  infrastructures,  such  as 
aqueducts,  schools  and  routes,  radio  stations,  food  security,  environmental  projects, 
rural  and  urban  development,  and  the  creation  of  municipal  councils  of  planning 
(CDPMM, 2001). On its first phase, the Peace Laboratory included 338 projects in 30 
municipalities (Aguilar, 2006: 8).  
Therefore, we can clearly identify various dimensions on the Peace Laboratory: 
it  has  a  very  strong  productive  component,  perhaps  even  excessively  dimensioned, 
taking into account its peacebuilding purpose. A large amount of the Peace Laboratory 
projects focus on the support to the cultivation of diverse goods, such as cacao, coffee, 
rice, yucca, fruit or african palm. 
There is also a manifest cultural and educational dimension. An education for 
peace and human rights, using civic programmes and art activities, play a large role on 
the Peace Laboratory’s purpose and projects. The goal to build an integral structure of 
peace, in which it is included not only economic and political services and institutions, 
is at the stake, just like the people and the paradigms of thought (Marco Fidel Vargas 
(2007). Peacebuilding has a strong cultural dimension. The Peace Laboratory and the 
PDPMM are aware of that. 
A concern with the environment is also very visible on the Peace Laboratory’s 
projects.  Magdalena  Medio  has  been  experiencing  severe  environmental  problems, 
facing an increasing pollution, contamination of the Magdalena River, deforestation and 
destruction of the ecosystems, mainly due to the coca economy and the oil and palm 
industries  (CDPMM,  2001:  6).  The  Laboratory  seeks,  thus,  to  build,  through  its 
projects,  a  sustainable  model  of  development  which  is  in  harmony  with  the 
environment.  
But one must also underline the Peace Laboratory institutional dimension. It puts 
a strong emphasis on institutional building and strengthening, considered one of the 
most significant structural problems that the region faces. Historically, the state and its 
institutions have been highly precarious in Magdalena Medio, thus contributing to the 
region’s underdevelopment  and violence. Through  projects, such as of formation of 
local  administrations  on  rights  and  public  policies,  the  impulse  to  associations  of 
municipalities,  participative  planning,  and  programmes  of  health  and  education 
strengthening  (Valderrama, 2007), the Peace Laboratory has been trying to address this 
problem.  A  great  concern  for  the  Laboratory  has  been  to  involve  the  local 
administrations  and  institutions  on  its  projects.  It  intends  to  draw  near  the  social 
networks  and  the  institutionality,  to  address  the  people’s  mistrust  towards  the   11 
institutions and the state and to increase the impact of the projects, by making them 
public policy. To a large extent, it represents a form of state-building at a micro level. 
 
3.3.  The  Peace  Laboratory:  an  European  initiative?  –  The  actors  of  the 
Peace Laboratory: 
 
The Peace Laboratory corresponds to a singular structure due to its open and 
heterogenic nature. It is a peculiar platform of actors. There are both endogenous and 
exogenous dynamics in the Laboratory. It is primarily a civil society creation, but it 
includes the Colombian state. It is mainly a Colombian initiative, but it works with 
international organizations. A triangle of dialogue and cooperation was formed by the 
Peace Laboratories. A 3B axis is drawn between Barrancabermeja, Bogotá and Brussels. 
It is a hybrid. Both social and state institutions are represented. It doesn’t correspond to 
an NGO or a political organization. It is an inter-institutional organisation, an open 
institution, crossed by many dynamics (Gutierrez, 2007).  
But the heart of the Peace Laboratory is clearly the Peace and Development 
Programme  of  Magdalena  Medio.  If  we  analyse  the  Laboratory’s  documents,  we’ll 
realise that it does not correspond to a specific and originally European approach of 
peace  intervention  (Gonzalez,  2004:  5).  It  is  rather  part  of  a  joint  and  cooperative 
development  strategy  with  the  Colombian  government,  with  other  international 
organizations, such as the UNDP
23 and the World Bank, and, above all, with the civil 
society.  
In fact, the Peace Laboratory didn’t start from zero. It was built on the base of an 
ongoing  project  and  process  in  the  region  of  Magdalena  Medio  –  the  PDPMM 
(Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 4). The role of the EU’s aid was principally to support 
the processes and dynamics already ongoing in the Colombian civil society (ibidem: 3, 
8). So, to a large amount, the Peace Laboratory is a sub-programme or a complement to 
a wider programme called PDPMM.  
Therefore, one can ask and wonder to what extent does the EU participate and 
structure the Peace Laboratory. Does it limit it to a financial role?  To sign checks? Or 
does  it  reflect  the  EU’s  values,  principles,  approach  and  perspective  of  conflict 
resolution in Colombia? What differentiates the PDPMM from the Peace Laboratory of 
Magdalena Medio?  
The strategic and methodological conception of the Peace Laboratory is based 
on  the  original  concept  of  the  Peace  and  Development  Programme  of  Magdalena 
Medio. Its design, development and implementation are mainly of the PDPMM. The 
process lies on the PDPMM. The Peace Laboratory is, above all, a European support to 
it. It corresponds to an amplification and deepening of the PDPMM. The role of the EU, 
and especially of the European Commission, is of a guide, a partner, a guarantee and a 
verifier, but not of an imposer of terms on the territory (Mojica, 2007). 
This corresponds to a large degree to a new European aid philosophy based on 
facilitating the means for empowerment, emancipation and autonomy. One can criticise 
the EU  for playing a small part in  the  process and  for not  being its leading  force. 
However, it is positive that the process is made bottom – up and that Europe allows the 
Programme to keep its autonomy. The EU does not have to and mustn’t give diktats of 
how to make peace. And it is politically relevant that the EU has supported this precise 
peace initiative.  
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However,  that  doesn’t  diminish  the  political  importance  of  the  EU  in  the 
process. Even if the Peace Laboratory and the PDPMM are not separate structures, nor 
projects, and even if the Peace Laboratory was born within the PDMM framework, to a 
large extent, it also constitutes a European creation and peacebuilding experiment. It 
complemented  the  PDPMM  with  new  objectives  and  considerations  and  with  the 
specificities of the European view, idiosyncrasies, methods and priorities. The concept 
of  a  “peace  laboratory”  was  a  European  proposal,  for  instance.  Besides,  the  EU 
involvement has contributed to strengthen and consolidate efforts by the PDPMM and 
to expand its successful experiences and projects (PDPMM, 2000) by the injection of 
more resources. This has permitted to summon much more organisations, to reach a 
larger number of people and to build a stronger base (Valderrama, 2007).  
Another important element was that the European involvement has amplified the 
political  dimension  of  the  PDPMM,  which  was  more  oriented  to  development  and 
productive processes with the World Bank financing and projects. The European Union 
has given priority to peacebuilding elements. It underlined namely the need to have a 
closer  work  and  articulation  with  the  local  administrations  and  institutions,  and  to 
produce agreements between the civil society and the armed actors, in order to reach 
peace (Bayona, 2007). But also other political projects were launched with the Peace 
Laboratory,  such  as  the  work  with  mines,  with  internally  displaced  people  and  the 
Humanitarian Spaces.  
Some  administrative  processes  have  also  changed  with  the  EU  participation 
(Wlaschutz,  2007).  The  European  aid  has  brought  new  procedures  and  norms  to 
Magdalena  Medio.  Yet,  these  have  been  criticized  by  many  as  being  heavy,  slow, 
inflexible,  and  highly  bureaucratic.  The  EU  imposed  a  complex  and  standardized 
normativity, which hardly adapts to the region’s reality, characterized by its informality, 
fragmentation  and  poverty.  This  has  provoked  profound  tensions  and  hard  debates 
between the EU and the PDPMM (Valderrama, 2007). Under heavy critic is principally 
the European method of public convocation for projects, accused of putting in jeopardy 
the on-going social processes of the Programme and obstructing excluded social sectors 
to  participate,  due to  its  inability  to  organize  themselves  and to  formulate  projects.  
However, this methodology was relatively changed on the Laboratory’s second phase, 
returning  more  to  the  Programme’s  experience  of  social  participation  based  on  the 
núcleos  de  pobladores.  Notwithstanding,  some  have  pointed  out  that  the  European 
methodology has brought more rigour, monitoring, systematization, accountability and 
technical capacity to the process. 
In addition, the Peace Laboratory does in fact reflect the EU’s peace approach to 
Colombia. The European peace policy to Colombia is based on two axis and objectives: 
on political and diplomatic efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict and 
on a structural conflict resolution approach, based on addressing the root causes of the 
conflict, such as poverty, exclusion and inequity. To a large extent, this is what is being 
tried to be put in practice at a local level in Magdalena Medio and in the other regions 
with Peace Laboratories. It seeks to be an element of facilitation of peace negotiations 
and it attempts to address, on a micro level, some of the problems and root causes of the 
conflict. Therefore, both the PDPMM and the European approach fit very well. The 
Peace  Laboratory  corresponds  to  a  “happy  marriage”  of  interests  and  perspectives 
between the PDPMM and the European Union.  
 Besides the EU and the PDPMM, other actors play an important role in the 
Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio. A central actor is the Corporación de Desarollo   13 
y  Paz  de  Magdalena  Medio
24  (CDPMM).  The  execution  of  the  Laboratory  was 
delegated  to  this  organization.  It  is  a  private  and  autonomous  entity,  with  legal 
personality, composed by the Diocese of Barrancabermeja and the Jesuit organization 
CINEP
25.  It  is  an  autonomous  structure, functioning  as  technical  and  administrative 
agent of the Programme, with power to prepare and execute plans and reports and which 
structures the projects with the local grass roots organizations, which receive and make 
use  of  the  resources.  There  is  a  high  component  of  decentralization  on  the  Peace 
Laboratory’s structure and functioning.  
In other regions the executive entity of the Laboratories is composed by other 
organizations.  The  Laboratories  search  for  strategic  partners  in  each  region  (Luna, 
2007). So, on Peace Laboratory II and III the partners and actors are different from 
those of Magdalena Medio.  
However,  in all  Laboratories,  and  particularly  in  Magdalena  Medio, a social 
actor is vital – the Church. There is a strong catholic and jesuit influence on the Peace 
Laboratory of Magdalena Medio, namely by the presence and participation of CINEP, 
the Diocese of Barrancabermeja, Pastoral Social and several priests, such as the director 
of  the  PDPMM  himself.  In  fact,  the  church  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  Laboratory. 
Without the church there would probably be no Peace Laboratory in Magdalena Medio. 
Not only was the Church very important for the PDPMM origin, by serving as a bridge 
between Ecopetrol and USO (Soto, 2007), as it has been vital for the PDPMM and 
Laboratory development and implementation. Church has a high capacity of summon in 
territories where the conflict is very intense and where there is a total polarization. All 
armed actors respect the church, its social work and its role in peace negotiations, albeit 
sometimes even the Church is in danger and under threat (Herrera, 2007). Its status and 
credibility has allowed the Laboratory to enter very difficult and violent zones and carry 
out projects in them. It has been functioning as a kind of umbrella for the process and 
the civil society. Moreover, even if  the Peace Laboratory and the PDPMM  are  not 
religious proposals, there is a certain philosophical Christian influence in them, namely 
by the Social Doctrine of the Church and the Liberation Theory concepts and views 
(Soto, 2007).  
The  other  main actor of  the Peace  Laboratory  is  the  state. The state can  be 
considered a sort of both an internal and an external actor to the Laboratory. It plays a 
crucial role, given that the European Commission canalizes its resources through it. Its 
main  beneficiary  and  direct interlocutor  is  the  ACCI
26,  the Colombian  International 
Cooperation  Agency  (Aguilar,  2006:  47).  It  is,  in  some  way,  a  bridge  and  an 
intermediary between the EU and the PDPMM. It forms one of the sides of the triangle 
Civil Society – European Union – State. The Peace Laboratory marks, in fact, a first 
collaboration between the EU and the Colombian government in terms of a strategy of 
cooperation for a peace process (Maio-Coliche, 2005: 36).  
However, some problems emerge by the state participation in the process.  The 
state is one of the parts in the conflict. Therefore, its peace and development perspective 
and goals not always coincide with those of the PDPMM and of the EU. The current 
Uribe’s administration denial of the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia and the 
use of rhetoric of “a democracy threatened by terrorists” is but an example (Herrera, 
2007). Notwithstanding, the state participation contributes to facilitate some processes, 
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to strengthen networks and the articulation with the EU and the civil society. Besides, 
the local and regional institutions have become an important target and a partner for the 
Laboratory’s projects.  
Equally important to the Peace Laboratory are the Núcleos de Pobladores. Ana 
Maria  Mojica  (2007),  member  of  staff  of  the  European  Commission  Delegation  in 
Colombia, considers them “the soul of the Laboratory”. They form the nuclear base and 
the  driving  force  of  the  PDPMM.  The  central  strategy  of  organization  and  social 
participation  of  the  PDPMM  sustains  on  the  Núcleos  de  Pobladores.  These  local 
groups,  composed  by  citizens  and  social  and  communitarian  organizations,  are 
responsible to formulate regional diagnoses and set development and peace proposals, 
expressed on the Municipal proposals. They define how the population sees the region, 
what are the needs of the region and what does the population want for the region. 
(Ibidem)  It  represents  a  fundamental  tool  of  citizen  organization  and  participation, 
through which strategic projects for the social and economic life of the municipalities 
are chosen, communitarian initiatives are prioritized, resources are canalized and the 
articulation with the local administrations is established (PDPMM,  2007). 
Also very relevant is the role of the PDPMM director, the Priest Francisco de 
Roux, known in the region as “Pacho”. Its leadership, personality and charisma, have 
been not only crucial for the PDPMM and Peace Laboratory origin, by the means of its 
personal regional, national and international contacts and networking, (Aguilar, 2006: 
35), but it has also played an important role in giving visibility to the Programme and 
implementing it in difficult regional and national conditions.  
Even tough the World Bank and the UNDP don’t participate directly on the 
Peace Laboratory, we should mention the importance of these actors in the process. 
There  is  an  articulation  and  coordination  between  these  international  organizations. 
Joint missions and programmes have been put in place. The beneficiary regions and 
municipalities are the identical for the EU, the World Bank and the UNDP; the core 
staff for the implementation of the programs is the same in all regions (Arboleda, 2007). 
Colombia,  and  Magdalena  Medio,  in  particular,  have  thus  become  a  sort  of  an 
“international fair of actors”. Not only the international organizations and the European 
Commission are present, but also, also bilateral aid from various countries.  
Finally, we can also consider an indirect actor to the Peace Laboratory – the 
armed actors. As Luz Angela Herrera (2007), from CINEP, refers, “all armed groups 
have their eyes on the Programmes”. They’re clearly a pressure and a strain to the 
Laboratory. They have the power to influence the Laboratory’s activities, to limit its 
impact or even to put in jeopardy its existence. Besides, the armed actors are, to some 
extent,  interlocutors  to  the  Laboratory’s  action.  The  Peace  Laboratory  deals  with 
matters of peace and conflict in a region of high violence. Therefore, the relation with 
the armed actors is something it necessarily needs to deal with. All Laboratory projects 
require some degree of negotiation and agreement with the armed actors in the field, in 
order to be put in place and function (Ibidem). 
In conclusion, all these different actors and partners who participate in the Peace 
Laboratory contribute to enrich it and make the Laboratory’s processes and networks 
more dynamic.  
 
 
3.4. The Peace Laboratory’s hypothesis and theoretical assumptions: 
 
3.4.1. The regional hypothesis:  
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The  Peace  Laboratory  departs from  two  hypotheses  and  is  sustained  on  two 
theoretical assumptions, both debatable from a theoretical point of view: the first one is 
that “Colombia is a country of regions” (Vargas, 2007).  
There is no doubt that the history of Colombia has shown the importance of the 
local. To a large amount the Colombian conflict and violence express themselves and 
are played on a local and regional level. The macro national conflict is composed by 
various different micro level conflicts.  
There are historical reasons for that. Colombia has never truly built a nation-
state.  Historically,  the  state  has  been  precarious.  The  national  territory  is  poorly 
integrated.  Not only Bogotá is very far geographically and institutionally from many 
zones of the country, as even the regional capitals sometimes are. There is what the 
Colombian  historian  Fernán  Gonzalez  (2007)  calls  a  “differentiated  presence  of the 
state”. Colombia is a country which lives simultaneously at various speeds. It has a 
variable  geometry.  Different  levels  of  development  and  institutionality  coexist, 
sometimes side by side. Quoting the title of the book by Jean-Michel Blanquer (2002), 
there are at least “Two Colombias”. There is a democratic, developed, industrialized, 
occidental and urban Colombia, close to Europe or the US, and a poor, marginalized, 
rural,  peasant,  under-developed,  without  rule  of  law,  fragmented,  violent  and 
uninstitutionalized Colombia, facing a Sub-Saharian African-like scenario or a XVII 
century temporality.  
In this historical and geographical context, strong regional identities have been 
developed. The sense of territorial belonging is deep. Being Paisa, Santanderian or 
Costeño  in  Colombia  is  full  of  meaning  (Herrera,  2007).  The  ethnic  and  societal 
composition of the country divides it into numerous regions, which could not be unified 
in a centralist regime which turned out to be artificial (De Roux, 2001). A nation-state 
in Colombia is still to be born.  
This fact constitutes one of the structural causes of the conflict. The space left 
over or never occupied historically by the state has been filled in the last decades by 
guerrillas and paramilitary groups. These often not only control militarily the territory, 
but they also act as a true “para-state”, frequently substituting it in its functions and 
roles, such as in justice and public services.  
Hence, the Colombian conflict has a different face in each region. It is fought 
differently  in  each  region.  Different  relations  between  the  army,  the  guerrillas,  the 
paramilitary, the population, the landowners and the drug traffickers are established 
(McDonald, 2007: 7). Each region develops its own conflict particularities. There are 
regionally differentiated expressions of the conflict. 
As Fernán Gonzalez (apud Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 11) affirms:  
“Violence doesn’t cover in a homogeneous way or with the same intensity the 
Colombian territory. The armed confrontation is highly differentiated,  following 
the internal dynamics of the regions in its settling, forms of social cohesion, its 
economic  organization,  its  linkage  to  the  national  and  global  economy,  its 
relation  with  the  state  and  the  political  regime  and  consequently  with  the 
differentiated and unequal presence of the institutions and state
27”    
Therefore,  the  Peace  Laboratory  perspective  is  that  conflict  resolution  in 
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Colombia must necessarily also pass by this micro level, by the diversity of the regions. 
The Peace Laboratories constitute an attempt to build peace at a regional level. It is a 
regional form of peacebuilding. The viewpoint is that the impasse on the national peace 
processes does not constitute an obstacle for regional agreements between the armed 
actors, the local administrations and the civil society be reached. As Manuel Bayona 
(2007), former sub-director of the PDPMM refers, the Peace Laboratory, and especially 
the  Humanitarian  Spaces  “seek  very  much  regional  dialogues,  as  neither  the 
paramilitary nor the guerrillas are a solid and unified block. There are huge differences 
between a front of a guerrilla in Sur de Bolivar, Antioquia or Putumayo. And the people 
know their leaders. They’re boys from the zone. [However], no government has had the 
will to develop regional dialogues
28”.  
Therefore, the Laboratory’s utopia is to build a nation in peace through regional 
development (Luna, 2007), and an integral focus on the regions. It intends to build a 
collective  project  of  region,  which  simultaneously  recognises  itself  as  part  of  the 
Colombian nationality (Katz, 2004: 32).  
 
 
3.4.2. The development hypothesis:  
 
 
To this regional hypothesis it adds a development hypothesis. The Laboratory’s 
focus is based on a concept of peace which sees poverty as one of the root causes of the 
conflict and a nexus between development and peace, poverty and violence.  
For the Laboratory, the conflict was born, to a large degree, due to the model of 
development  put in practice in Colombia, and specifically in the Magdalena Medio 
region.  That  is  an  extractive  and  exclusive  model,  which  generates  poverty  and 
inequality (Vargas, 2007), even though the region is rich in resources and Colombia is a 
medium income country.  
The role poverty and inequality play in conflict, in general terms, and on the 
Colombian case, is a controversial issue. It is object of a heated debate both politically 
and academically. There are different views on the matter. However, there is a general 
perception and acceptance on the academia that there is a correlation between poverty 
and conflicts (Gutierrez, 2001: 55).  It is not an automatic relation, nor a deterministic 
one. There are other elements and variables involved. Poverty per se does not lead to 
violence. Above all, poverty implies a risk of violence. Peace can’t prevail where the 
economic and social conditions are not sustainable. Societies unable to meet the needs 
of its citizens are more vulnerable to collapse and to conflicts.  
For the relative deprivation theory, which has in Ted Gurr one of its most central 
references, there is a particular factor that plays an important role in political violence – 
inequality. According to Sambanis (2004: 14), “Persistent inequality leads to anger and 
despair,  which  reinforces  the  demand  for  political  change.”  If  there  are  important 
differences  between  groups  in  terms  of  economic  and  political  power,  “relatively 
deprived groups are likely to seek (or be persuaded by their leaders to seek) redress” 
(Stewart, 2002) to this conditions. In fact, poverty is often linked to power distribution. 
Poverty can be a strong root cause for violence, especially where its distribution overlap 
                                                
28 “Los Espacios Humanitarios reclaman mucho los diálogos regionales. Por que los paras y las guerrillas 
tampoco son un bloque sólido y unido. Hay diferencias abismales entre un frente de la guerrilla que está 
en el Sur de Bolívar, Antioquia o en el Putumayo. Y la gente conoce a los líderes. Son muchachos de la 
zona. Pero en ningún gobierno hubo la voluntad de desarrollar diálogos regionales”.   
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with  ethnic  cleavages  and  power  structures  (Croissant,  2005).  In  that  case,  poverty 
becomes a mobilization factor, since it is part of an easily identifiable socio-economic 
or political structure to blame. 
These theoretical standpoints are attested by much empirical data. Conflict and 
political violence affect mainly developing countries. In deed, there is a statistical link 
between poverty and conflict. Several authors and studies analyse and emphasize this 
empirical  evidence.  According  to  the  Armed  Conflicts  Report  of  2005,  47%  of  the 
countries with a low index of human development have suffered violent conflicts in the 
last  decade.  The  same  happens  with  29.1%  of  medium  development.  There  is  a 
connection  between  underdevelopment  and  violence.  The  probability  of  an  armed 
conflict  affecting  a  state  increases  as  its  development  index  lowers  (Project 
Ploughshares, 2005). The risk of a violent conflict erupting is four times greater in a 
Developing Country than in an OECD
29 country (Collier et al, 2003). 
According  to  Mark  Duffield  (2005,  16),  this  link  between  development  and 
peace  is  not  a  new  one.  There  is  a  historical  connection  between  peace  and 
development. The notions converge. They’re closely interconnected. Reaching one is 
seen as an essential  element to  reach the other.  Development  is impossible without 
stability and peace is not sustainable without development. 
That  is  the  theoretical  perspective  adopted  by  the  Laboratory.  The  fact  that 
Colombia is a country with high levels of poverty and inequity has made it more prone 
to  violence  (Gutierrez,  2001:  57).  Therefore,  the  Peace  Laboratory  is  also  a 
development proposal. It is sustained on a development hypothesis. It seeks to find and 
build a different and alternative model of development, a more participative, inclusive 
and equitable one, thus contributing to address the structural elements that sustain the 
conflict.  
So, the productive projects play a vital role on the Laboratory’s objectives. It 
seeks  to  find  solutions  for  the  traditional  economies  and  make  them  profitable.  In 
particular, there is a strong support to Finca Campesina, the peasant property, through 
projects based on collective and associative work and organization. 
To a large extent, what is at stake is to “take workforce out of war” (Bertolini, 
2007). The Peace Laboratory’s perspective is that “when you have a certain level of 
development it makes it more difficult to involve in war affairs and, besides, you have 
more elements to face the armed actors”
30 (apud Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 26). Even 
tough the armed conflict concentrates itself territorially mainly on the richest zones of 
the country, where resources, such as oil, gold or cattle are concentrated and serve as 
means of financing for the armed groups, the recruiting of men for their causes is done 
principally  in  the  poor  zones,  among  the  marginalized  peasants  (Bayona,  2007). 
Magdalena Medio includes and corresponds to both these realities. It is a zone where, 
due to its resources, all armed groups are present, and where poverty, unemployment 
and isolation constitute a means of mobilization and recruiting for the insurgency and 
counterinsurgency.  
Therefore, creating development, employment and alternatives for the excluded 
in the region is, to a large amount, to take young men out of the armed groups (Herrera, 
2007). If we consider that poverty is a structural cause of the Colombian conflict, to 
produce development is to produce externalities of peace. 
 
 
                                                
29 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development    
30 “[...] cuando usted tiene esos niveles de desarrollo es más difícil que se involucre en asuntos de la 
guerra, y fuera de eso tiene usted más elementos para enfrentarse al actor armado”   18 
 
3.5. The Peace and Development dimensions: 
 
The  Peace  Laboratory  is  a  multidimensional  initiative,  but  one  that  clearly 
sustains on two main axis and dimensions – peace and development. We will refer 
following in more detail to each one of them.    
 
 
3.5.1.  The  peace  dimension:  the  model  of  peacebuilding  of  the  Peace 
Laboratory: 
 
3.5.1.1. The concept of Peace Laboratory: 
 
 
Considering something which intends to be a laboratory of peace, it is crucial to 
define and analyse what model of peacebuilding it conveys and what model of peace 
does it stand for.  
One first clue can be found in its name. When looking at the Peace Laboratory, the 
first thing that pops up and comes to one’s mind is its name. It is a quite relevant name. 
In  fact,  it  does  convey  a  concept  and  a  message.  It  suggests  an  attempt  to  build 
something  new.  It  implies  an  idea  of  exploration,  observation  and  innovation,  an 
experiment in the field of peacebuilding. And this aspects are indeed quite part of the 
Laboratory’s philosophy and concept. It tries to explore new ways of building peace and 
development at a local and regional level. It is a process in construction with all the 
people and organisations involved and without a predefined or pre-established model. It 
doesn’t intend to be a substitute to the national negotiations with the armed actors, but 
to serve as a learning process and a source of innovation in the field of peace (De Roux, 
2001).  
Moreover, it conveys a political message from the EU. It focuses on peace and bases 
its approach on peace. It is politically relevant that the name “peace laboratory” was 
chosen by the EU. The European  Union had  - by the majority of  its members  and 
institutions - opposed to Plan Colombia due to its military component. With the creation 
of  the  Peace  Laboratories,  in  its  own  name,  it  transmits  a  concept  opposed  to  the 
military, relating the pacific with Europe and the military to the US (Loingsigh, 2005).  
The term laboratory also suggests an idea of reproducing something and one reality. 
Actually, this is one of the purposes of the Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio. It 
aims at the reproduction of this experience of peacebuilding and development in other 
regions of Colombia and at the national level. And this has been done with the creation 
of Peace Laboratory II and III in other regions of the country.  
However, one must bear in mind that we are not dealing with a real laboratory. This 
is not a scientific experiment. It cannot be easily reproduced and its variables cannot be 






3.5.1.2. The model of peacebuilding of the Peace Laboratory: 
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One  can  identify  at  least  four  elements  in  the  Peace  Laboratory’s  model  of 
peacebuilding: its placement and focus on the micro level, its peacebuiling from below 
character, its structural approach and its broad concept of peace.  
 
a) The Micro level:  
 
The Peace Laboratory was designed to work at a micro level. The experience is 
intrinsically local: it is born in the local; it is structured and designed for the local; it 
develops in the local. It assumes that the local and regional are extremely important for 
building a country in peace, especially in a place like Colombia. It seeks to address, at a 
micro  level,  the  socioeconomic  and  cultural  conditions  which  sustain  the  conflict 
regionally. The fact that national peace negotiations have suffered severe difficulties 
and  shown  hard  political  limitations  amplifies  the  significance  of  these  local  peace 
initiatives (Roy, 2003: 19). Besides, as refers the president of Vallenpaz, “It is easier to 
build  peace  at  a  local  level  rather  than  at  the  national  level.  When  you  have  a 
community  where  there  are  different  armed  actors  (guerrillas,  paramilitaries,  army, 
peasants),  it  is  easier  to  reach  an  agreement  through  concrete  proposals  for  the 
improvement of the way of living of the people
31” (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 34).  
However, being in its essence a micro initiative, the Peace Laboratory intends to 
articulate this micro level with a mezzo and macro level. It seeks to have a national 
impact and to be a pilot experience which could be replicated and reproduced on other 
regional micro levels.  
 
b) A peacebuilding from below: 
 
To a large amount, the Peace Laboratory model corresponds to a peacebuilding 
from below. The Laboratory tries to build peace with the local grass roots organizations 
following  a  bottom-up  dynamic.  It  sustains  on  a  participative  methodology  which 
attempts  to  develop  social,  economic  and  political  processes  with  the  historically 
marginalized sectors of the population. It views the social actors as fundamental players 
of peacebuilding and argue that civilians must not be treated as passive or invisible 
actors.  (Aguilar,  2006:  22).  The  Peace  Laboratory  defends  that  “peace  represents  a 
collective  interest  and  shouldn’t  be  handled  exclusively  from  the  government’s 
centrality”
32 (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 34). In order to be sustainable, peace has to be 
built and created from the base. It follows the viewpoint that “those most affected by 
violence, who understand and have to live with its consequences, are likely to be best 
placed to find the most appropriate solutions to it” (McDonald, 1997: 2). It is based on a 
conception of peace as not just a matter of elites and as a result of peace negotiations 
between warring parties. It follows the principle that “Magdalena Medio should be built 
between  all”  (PDPMM,  2007),  structuring  this  principle  around  the  participative 
experience of the Núcleos de Pobladores. In fact, the complexity of the Colombian 
violence requires solutions which would go beyond negotiations between insurgents and 
the state. Peace can’t absolutely be imposed top-down. Therefore, it must be followed 
by complementary and multilevel peacebuilding strategies (McDonald, 1997: 14).  
                                                
31 “Es más fácil hacer la paz a nivel local que a nivel nacional. Cuando se plantea a una comunidad donde 
hay distintos actores armados (guerrillas, paramilitares, Ejército, campesinos) propuestas concretas para 
el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida es más fácil ponerse de acuerdo.” 
32 “la paz representa un interés colectivo que no debe ser manejado exclusivamente desde la centralidad 
del gobierno.”   20 
This is a perspective which has had an increasing importance and feedback both 
on  conflict  resolution  theory  and  practice.    Several  authors  have  emphasised  the 
peacemaking role of the local communities, underlining that “effective and sustainable 
peacemaking  processes  must  be  based  not  merely  on  the  manipulation  of  peace 
agreements made by elites, but more importantly on the empowerment of communities 
torn apart by war” (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 215).  
In this respect, it is particularly relevant the work of John Paul Lederach.  This 
author developed an analytical framework of conflict and conflict resolution based on a 
conflict pyramid composed by three levels of leadership and actors. Level 1 corresponds 
to political and military leaders of the conflict; level 2 to regional intermediate leaders; 
and level 3 to the grassroots leaders and the population exposed to the conflict. For 
Lederach, all three levels are equally important in order to build peace. All must be 
object of conflict resolution strategies and not only the top of the pyramid, as it usually 
happens regarding conflict resolution (Ibidem: 221). Peacebuilding is, thus, a multilevel 
task and the foundations of peace should start to be built on the base of the pyramid. 
The  Peace  Laboratory,  trying  to  articulate  local  community  leaders  to  the  regional, 
national and international spheres, can be considered an attempt to gather these different 
levels of the pyramid. 
But  one  can  also  mention  Adam  Curle.  He  too  refers  to  the  limits  of 
conventional  diplomacy.  According  to  this  author  “solutions  reached  through 
negotiation may be simply expedient and not imply any change of heart. And this is the 
crux of peace. There must be a change of heart.”(apud Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 217). 
For that change of heart to be made, the role of the conflicting communities and of the 
civil society is essential.  
 
c) Structural conflict resolution: 
 
The third element of the Laboratory’s model of peacebuilding is its structural 
dimension. The Peace Laboratory action, with its inherent long term logic and the fact 
that it is oriented to the elimination of the root causes of the conflict, configures what 
could be called as a “structural conflict resolution”. In fact, it aims to understand and 
transform, at the local and regional level, the structures which cause and sustain the 
conflict. It departs from the idea that “if there is a war in Colombia it is because there 
are  structural  factors  which  propitiate  it”
33,  such  as  poverty  and  land  concentration 
(Bayona, 2007).   
A structural peacebuilding implies addressing the social structures of indirect 
violence, such as poverty, exploitation, misery, repression and human rights violations 
(Galtung, 1996). This is obviously a long term process, and the PDPMM is aware of 
that.  But,  as  Francisco  de  Roux  (2001)  puts  it,  “without  these  [structural] 
transformations, peace is but a good intentions speech”
34. Thus, the Peace Laboratory 
has a strong political, socio-economic and cultural focus.  It pays particularly a high 
attention to the development issues, considered one of the main structural causes of the 
conflict and keys to solve it, but it has also a strong focus on culture of peace and peace 
education.  
In fact, the Peace Laboratory structures several projects and programmes around 
that matter. Basically, it intends to build a collective imaginary favourable to peace, by 
the means of “peace schools” and a strategy of art for the divulgation of human rights 
(OPI,  2006:  64).  There  is  an  important  pedagogical  strategy  within  the  Peace 
                                                
33 “Se hay guerra en Colombia es por que hay factores estructurales que la propician.” 
34 “Sin estas transformaciones la paz es solo un discurso de buenas intenciones.”   21 
Laboratory and the PDPMM. Schools are an important values referrals and a tool for 
conflict  resolution  (Saavedra  and  Ojeda,  2006:  34).  These  peace  schools  intend  to 
propitiate  spaces  for  cultural  exchange,  to  increment  solidarity  and  to  strengthen  a 
public peace opinion (OPI, 2006: 65). But also a particular attention is made to art. As 
Libardo Valderrama (2007) tells, “if one listens to the songs of Magdalena Medio, one 
gets disturbed, as some are in favour of war, others of coca. It is an entire culture which 
we need to change”
35. It is evident, in this subject, an influence on the PDPMM of the 
UNESCO’s  concept  and  views  on  culture  of  peace,  to  which  it  resorts  and  refers 
explicitly.  
This structural approach to peacebuilding has received the contribution of much 
theoretical literature. It has been emphasized by authors such as Johan Galtung, John 
Burton, Franklin Dukes, and Richard Rubenstein.   
Galtung  introduced  the  concepts  of  structural  peace  and  structural  violence, 
widening the field of peace and violence and underlying the importance of the social, 
political,  economic  and  cultural  structures  in  peacebuilding.  The  influence  of  the 
Norwegian  author  is  notorious  on  the  Laboratory’s  concepts  and  model  of 
peacebuilding.  
John Burton’s (1990) human needs theory has been also an important contribute 
to a structural approach to conflict resolution. It portrays conflict has a product of unmet 
human  needs,  recognizing  that,  contrarily  to  interests,  human  needs  cannot  be 
negotiated, changed  or  suppressed.  The  Peace Laboratory’s  emphasis on  productive 
projects and development issues has much to do with a concern to address the unmet 
human needs of the population, viewed as a cause of violence in the region.  
Another  relevant  author  in  this  respect,  Franklin  Dukes  (1999),  describes 
conflict as structural phenomena, defending that systemic forces are at the origin of the 
conflicts and its dynamics. For him, peace, in order to build sustainable, has to be more 
than  simple  negotiation  agreements,  and  conflict  resolution  must  be  more  than  a 
communication and negotiation technique. Conflict resolution must deal with the impact 
of the structures and understand the sources and root causes of the conflicts.  
A  similar  perspective  is  showed  by  Richard  Rubenstein  (1999:  173),  who 
portrays conflict as a product of social patternized relations that fail to satisfy the basic 
needs of the parts. For him, conflicts have structural causes and are not merely the result 
of  failures  of  communication,  incompatible  objectives  and  confronting  values.  As  a 
result, if conflict resolution intends to be more than conflict management, more than 
temporary  agreements  of  elites,  it  requires a  transformation  of  the  structures  which 
sustain the conflict.  
In fact, much of the Colombian history provides evidence of this problem. On 
several occasions, periods of war, such as the Thousand Day War, from 1889 to 1902, 
or La Violencia, in the forties and fifties, have ended through elite agreements, ignoring 
and  undervaluing  the  structural  elements  in  the  violence  (McDonald,  1997:  3). 
Hostilities  were  ended,  but  the  structures  of  violence  and  the  culture  of  violence 
remained, continuing to burst repeatedly on several occasions.  
In addition, the successive failure of the negotiations with the guerrillas has also 
much to do with the structural elements of the conflict. As Geraldine MacDonald (1997: 
3)  affirms,  “Peace  accords  signed  during  the  1980s  broke  down  repeatedly,  partly 
because  compromise  “solutions”  failed  to  tackle  the  root  causes  of  the  problem.” 
Therefore, even on the negotiation table the structural dimension of peacebuilding is 
                                                
35 “Se se escucha las canciones del Magdalena Medio, uno queda aflicto por que algunas son a favor de la 
guerra, otras de la coca. Es toda una cultura que es preciso evolucionar.”     22 
manifest. This is quite evident on the guerrilla’s claims for political and socio-economic 
reforms, which have been not much taken into account in the negotiations so far, and 
have been one of the reasons for a constant failure of the peace processes. For the 
guerrillas, at least in its speech, if there is not a solution to the country’s structural 
problems, there is no solution to the conflict.  
 
 
d) A broad concept of peace:  
 
Thus, the  Peace Laboratory  has and  promotes a broad concept of peace and 
peacebuilding, one which implies much more than the silencing of the rifles (Saavedra 
and  Ojeda,  2006:  31).  It  follows,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  voluntarily  or 
involuntarily, a peace approach that can be framed within a Peace Research focus, based 
on an integral view of peace and conflict, on an emphasis on structural factors and a on 
a strong link between the development and peace themes.  
Johan Galtung’s (1996) concept of Positive Peace is particularly relevant and 
applicable in this framework. According to this author, violence does not only mean 
physical  violence  and  peace  is  not  only  the  absence  of  war.  That  is  a  negative 
conception of peace. He opposes to this a positive concept of peace. For Galtung there 
is  a structural and a cultural dimension  in violence and peace, related to the social 
structures which sustain them and the cultural elements which legitimize them. To a 
large extent, and with explicit references on some of its official documents, the Peace 
Laboratory seeks to build and make possible a positive peace. To Christian Wlaschütz 
(2007), member of staff of the PDPMM, “the idea of positive peace is something very 
conscient within the Peace Laboratory and the PDPMM. It is included on its lines of 
work”. Besides, it constitutes a concern for the PDPMM’s Observatorio de Paz Integral 
(OPI, 2006: 64), which has among its work areas the identification of peace initiatives 
in Magdalena Medio which can be framed within this concept
36.  
In deed, the Peace Laboratory expresses a concept of positive peace, portraying 
peacebuilding as a fulfilment of human rights of all generations (Saavedra and Ojeda, 
2006: 32). It conveys an integral approach. The peace Laboratory is not an organization 
of humanitarian assistance (Aguilar, 2006: 47). It goes way beyond that. The wide range 
of  projects  the  Laboratory  deals  with  is  only  comprehensive  within  this  broad  and 
maximalist concept of peace.  
Notwithstanding, one must underline that the Peace Laboratory doesn’t follow 
explicitly any specific model of peacebuilding. Due to the complexity of the Colombian 
conflict and the openness and integrality of the Peace Laboratory no theoretical model 
can really totally apply. It is something being searched and built on the field, even 
though it sustains on some theoretical concepts and assumptions. There is no predefined 
model on the Peace Laboratory.  
 
3.5.1.3. The Humanitarian Spaces: 
 
Some of  the  most important, interesting and ambitious projects of  the Peace 
Laboratory in the peacebuilding field are the so-called Humanitarian Spaces.  
                                                
36According to the OPI one can identify a trend in the region of a growing social mobilization, which 
includes collective actions for peace of a reflexive and propositive type (OPI, 2006: 64). 
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They  are  fundamentally  spaces  of  civil  resistance  to  the  armed  groups  and 
empowerment of the  local communities. They were  conceived  as a form to “create 
favorable  conditions  to  the  life  of  the  population  in  the  territories  with  the  highest 
impact of the armed conflict and the weakest presence of the state, and, therefore, with 
most vulnerability of the civilian population”
37 (PDPMM, 2007).  
They  correspond  to  places  where  the  civilian  population,  facing  a  high  and 
constant pressure by the paramilitaries and guerrillas, and sick of the state failure and 
incapability  to  protect  them,  decided  to  organize  themselves  and  face  the  problem 
directly (Aguilar, 2006:  36). These are places where people  said “no more” to war 
(Vargas, 2007). They chose not to join the armed groups, nor to be displaced. They took 
a third way – the way of civil disobedience and civil resistance. 
The Humanitarian Spaces were introduced in 2003, for the second phase of the 
Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio (De Roux: 2005: 42). They were planned and 
structured for 13 critical zones
38 
39, where the causes and effects of the conflict and of 
the economy of violence are more concentrated. These are the zones the most exposed 
to  the  sequels  of  the  armed  conflict,  to  blockades  and  territorial  dispute.  They’re 
characterized as being eminently rural and peripheral zones, which face situations of 
extreme  poverty  and  marginality,  violence,  existence  of  coca  plantations  and  weak 
presence of the state (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 18). 
They seek to be what Sabine Kurtenbach (2005: 10) calls “islands of civility”. 
Their aim is to build a citizen alternative to the conflict, to generate spaces of dialogue 
(Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 19) and collective symbols of solidarity and affirmation 
of dignity. They also intend to be zones free of coca plantations, one the major fuels to 
the armed conflict, thus focusing on alternative development. Their major fundaments 
are the protection of life and territory, the development and peace of the communities, 
and the respect for work, education, human rights and Humanitarian International Law. 
In this respect, the application of the principle of distinction between civilian population 
and  combatants  and  public  goods  from  military  targets  has  been  crucial.  The 
Humanitarian Spaces are, above all, social processes of defence of life and protection of 
the population. They attempt to lower the aggressions against civilians and against the 
social and productive facilities and seek the non intervention and presence of the armed 
actors (PDPMM, 2007). 
One of the means the Peace Laboratory has used regarding this objective has 
been to impulse an institutional backing and articulation with the Humanitarian Spaces. 
These spaces correspond to territories of an extremely weak and precarious presence of 
the state, where the only institutionality the people has known is the army, often in a 
                                                
37 “crear condiciones favorables para la vida de los pobladores (as) en los territorios de más alto impacto 
del conflicto armado, escasa presencia del Estado, y por tanto, mayor vulnerabilidad de la población 
civil.” 
38 These include: Proceso Territorial Comité de Integración de Comunidades Agromineras del Sur Sur de 
Bolívar- San Pablo; Espacio Humanitario de Bajo Peñón; Comunidades de Borrascaso Opón Landázuri; 
Proceso de paz y desarrollo integral de La India; Zona de Desarrollo Integral del Sur de Bolívar (San 
Pablo, Simití y Cantagallo); Comunidades Agromineras de la Serranía de San Lucas; Zona de Reserva 
Campesina de Morales y Arenal;  Proceso  Soberano  Comunitario  por  la  Vida,  la  Justicia  y  la  Paz  
Micoahumado  –  Corcovado;  Consejo  Permanente  por  la  Vida,  la  Justicia  y  la  Paz  del  Alto  Arenal; 
Proceso Ciudadano por Tiquisio;  Proceso Territorial por la Vida, la Convivencia y el Desarrollo, parte 
Alta de Río Viejo; Espacio Humanitario de la Serranía del Perijá y la zona urbana de Aguachica- Malokas 
protegidas del sur del César; Zona rural de Santa Rosa y Simití. http://www.pdpmm.org.co/FAQs.asp 
 
39 Vide attachment nº 4.    24 
repressive way. As the sub-director of the PDPMM refers, “people just know the face of 
war, not of health or education” […] [The Humanitarian Spaces seek, thus,] “to make 
the people start to discover themselves as citizens, to find new forms of institutionality, 
and discover a new face of the State beyond the guns”
40 (Valderrama, 2007). In this 
respect,  it  has  been  particularly  relevant  the  Peace  Laboratory’s  work  with  the 
Defensoria  del  Pueblo.  This  has  instituted  a  process  of  dialogue  between  the 
communities and the institutionality, which has allowed people to be listened and to 
recognise themselves as citizens (Ibidem).  
But the Humanitarian Spaces have also been trying to put in place processes of 
dialogue with the armed actors, to create conciliation tables. Despite the national peace 
process blockade with the guerrillas, and independently from its evolution, the Peace 
Laboratory’s  perspective  is  that  regional  dialogues  can  be  put  in  practice  (Bayona, 
2007), and local agreements with the insurgents and counter insurgents are possible, so 
that the life of the communities can be improved. And some agreements have been 
reached, mainly on the humanitarian field, but also concerning the demining of some 
areas (Paez, 2006). The role of the church as an interlocutor in these processes has been 
vital.  More  successful  or  unsuccessful  these  experiences  may  be,  the  Humanitarian 
Spaces  demand  beyond  doubt  a  certain  dialogue  with  the  armed  actors,  due  to  the 
conflictual issues they approach and deal with (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 45). 
In fact, the Humanitarian Spaces have been extremely important instruments of 
civility in the middle of the conflict. Even though they face very difficult conditions, 
they have helped to prevent forced displacement; they have reduced the population’s 
vulnerability;  and  they  have  contributed  to  strengthen  and  empower  the  local 
communities and to generate collective symbols of solidarity and dignity. These were 
marginalized and silenced communities which the Humanitarian Spaces have helped to 
make visible and empower (Mojica, 2007).  
However, the Humanitarian Spaces are under heavy pressure. They face a great 
deal of difficulties and problems, from the political, military and organizational point of 
view (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 20). The conflict dynamics, as the local clientelist 
practices, are still very present and strong in these territories, despite the presence of the 
Humanitarian  Spaces.  This  experience  can’t  be  completely  considered  a  success. 
Violence and human rights violations have remained very high on much of these areas 
(Mojica, 2007). However, not all Humanitarian Spaces show the same results. They 
don’t  have  grown  and  developed  at  the  same  rhythm  (Bertolini,  2007).  There  are 
different  outcomes,  depending  on  the  leaderships  of  the  processes,  on  the  local 
dynamics and the presence of the armed actors and the mafias. 
This paper had as fieldwork the visit, in particular, to the Humanitarian Space of 
Tiquisio, officially called Proceso Ciudadano por Tiquisio
41. Tiquisio is a municipality 
in the department of Bolívar, counting with 23.000 inhabitants. It is a remote place, lost 
in  between  mountains  and  lakes,  far  from  the  world,  the  state  and  even 
Barrancabermeja. It takes about eight hours to reach it from Barrancabermeja, even if 
the region is no more than the size of Belgium, travelling through the sinuous routes of 
the mountains and the brown waters of the Magdalena River. It is a deeply isolated 
zone, physically and institutionally.  
  As in the other Humanitarian Spaces it shows visible signs of poverty, violence 
and  abandon  by  the  state.  It  is  mainly  a  peasant  and  mining  zone,  visibly  lacking 
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development and public services. Violence has also surrounded the area for long-time. 
The ELN has dominated militarily the territory for many years. Then the paramilitary 
took over, in a similar pattern as several other places in Magdalena Medio.  The armed 
actors presence has to a certain point appeased in the last years. The Humanitarian 
Space has probably played a role in that. However, the sinuous routes which lead to 
Tiquisio are still filled with army, paramilitary and guerrilla checkpoints.  
In the last years, the luxurious landscape and myriad  of colours and species 
which  surround  Tiquisio  have  been  followed  by  the  new  colours  and  élan  the 
Humanitarian Space has brought to the zone. The Proceso Ciudadano por Tiquisio has 
been highly significant for its population. The peasants speak with a smile on their faces 
of the Humanitarian Space and its achievements, expressing its deep gratitude to the 
PDPMM  and  the  European  Union.  People  have  learned  to  read  thanks  to  the 
Laboratory,  have  been educated  and  trained culturally  and  politically,  have  become 
aware  of  their  rights;  a  radio  station  has  been created; facilities  have  been  built;  it 
allowed the community to organize and mobilize itself; and more importantly, it has 
been an important instrument of resistance to paramilitarism and forced displacement. 
As a peasant from the Humanitarian Space of Tiquisio said, “the Humanitarian Space 
did more for the population in 4 years than the Parish Council in twelve”.  
All in all, the Humanitarian Spaces constitute an enormous dare for the Peace 
Laboratory. They represent the presence of the Laboratory where the war is (Vargas, 
2007). A success in this field would be deeply meaningful. It would be a sort of flowers 
which  blossom  in  the  middle  of  the  desert.  For  José  Antonio  Paez  (2006),  the 
Humanitarian Spaces are somehow the inversion of Che Guevara’s theory of the foco. 
Instead of trying to identify and to spread small focos of insurrection and liberation war, 
the  Humanitarian  Spaces  attempt  to  concentrate  in  small  territories  affected  by  the 
conflict efforts to shelter the population and to accomplish minimal humanitarian rules. 
As in Guevara’s approach, this small intervention is expected to a positive example 
which can disseminate in a larger social framework and scenario. It corresponds, to 
some  extent,  to  a  humanitarian  foquismo.  According  to  Elise  Boulding,  cultures  of 
peace can survive in deed in small spaces and pockets even in the most violent of 
conflicts (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 217).  Notwithstanding, it is a great challenge and an 
extremely difficult task.  
 
 
3.6. The Development dimension: 
 
The second axis of the Peace Laboratory is its development dimension. On its 
structure, it corresponds mainly to the productive farming activities component. But it 
constitutes a transversal concern within the Laboratory’s objectives and projects. There 
is a strong focus on development within the Peace Laboratory, since it sustains on a 
“development  hypothesis”,  on  a  theoretical  assumption  and  view  which  portrays 
poverty and the model of development in force in Colombia and in Magdalena Medio as 
a root cause of the conflict. Therefore, these two axes – peace and development, are 
intimately interconnected.  They are not separate and independent components. And that 
constitutes one of the original and groundbreaking elements of the Peace Laboratory 
and the PDPMM.  
Fundamentally, the PDPMM has been attempting to reflect on a new model of 
development  for  Magdalena  Medio,  one  which  would  contribute  to  address  the 
structural problems of the region, to include the excluded sectors of the population and 
to  address  the  social  and  armed  conflict.  It  intends  to  build  an  alternative  form  of   26 
development in Magdalena Medio, to sow seeds of an alternative economic model.  
 The  Magdalena  Medio’s  model  of  development  has  been  centred  in  the  oil 
industry and on extensive cattle cultivation and agro-industry recently. Despite creating, 
to a certain level, a high income to the region, this economic model has left the vast 
majority of the population - peasants mainly - in poverty. Magdalena Medio faces an 
absolute  and  relative  high  level  of  poverty  and  a  manifest  lack  of  social  services, 
facilities and employment (CDPMM,  2001: 5). The problem lays essentially on the 
structures and model of production and on the income distribution, or in this case, on 
the lack of it. These economic activities are mainly of an extractive type. The income 
they  generate  benefits  only  a  few,  and  definitely  not  the  majority  of  the  region’s 
peasants  and  workers.  There  is  a  manifest  socio-economic  inequality  in  Magdalena 
Medio  and  a  strong  concentration  of  land  and  capital  (Ibidem),  which  have  been 
increasing  in  the  last  years.    In  fact,  the  peasant  economy  has  been  facing  serious 
difficulties  and  threats, which  menace  its  survival.  First  and foremost,  it  suffers  an 
aggressive dynamic by the extensive cattle cultivation and the agroindustry. Its increase 
has been done through the abusive appropriation of large extensions of land backed by 
paramilitary and drug violence. This has provoked the forced displacement of thousands 
of  families,  an  increase  of  rural  unemployment  and  a  threat  to  the  region’s  and 
population’s food security (Paez, 2006).  
Struggling  against  this  framework  and  trend,  the  Peace  Laboratory  seeks  to 
support the peasant economy and build a more participative, inclusive and equitable 
model of development. This model sustains mainly on finca campesina, the peasant 
property. 
Finca  Campesina  is  a  small  property  (generally  a  family  agrarian  unit) 
corresponding to an area around 10 to 12 hectares (Wlaschütz, 2007). It is characterised 
by its weakness and vulnerability in respect to the market, by a low access to credit, a 
peripheral geographic situation and an economic dependency (Loingsigh, 2005). The 
peasant economy follows a different logic if we compare it to the market or capitalistic 
agriculture (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 25). It doesn’t necessarily have a logic of 
profit. 
The Peace Laboratory focus on finca campesina, as an alternative to the large 
proprieties (De Roux, 2005: 42) and the mega projects Magdalena Medio has been seen. 
This project is conceived as a program of transformation. It seeks a qualitative and 
quantitative economic boost for the region. The first thing it searches is to guarantee the 
self  supply  and  food  security  of  the  region  (Mojica,  2007).  Furthermore,  finca 
campesina and the productive projects, as they are conceived by the Laboratory, seek 
not only to fulfill the basic needs of the population, but also to have surplus, which 
allow  them  to  improve  their  life  conditions  and  have  access  to  services,  such  as 
education and health (Valderrama, 2007). In addition, these projects intend to foster a 
rational use of the resources and a harmony with the environment.  
In this field, one of the Peace Laboratory’s main economic proposals is for the 
peasants to organise themselves collectively (Herrera, 2007). The Laboratory supports 
associative work in farm cooperatives and peasant reserve zones. Through this, it aims 
at promoting the stability of the small farmers, to neutralise the land concentration and 
to be an alternative to the large properties (De Roux, 2005: 42).  
To a large extent, this is a means to try to relieve and address the fundamental 
problem of the peasant economy in Colombia – the lack of land.  The land problem is 
one of the major structural causes of the Colombian conflict. It is a historically non 
resolved  issue.  As  Marco  Fidel  Vargas  affirms,  “land  is  the  key  to  solve  the  rural 
problem  in  Colombia.  And  the  rural  problem  is  the  key  to  solve  the  Colombian   27 
conflict
42” (Vargas, 2007). 
Magdalena  Medio  has  been  suffering  an  accelerated  process  of  land 
concentration,  motivated  by  a  true  “counter  agrarian  reform”  carried  out  by  the 
paramilitary  and  the  drug  dealers,  but  also  by  the  economic  pressure  of  the  large 
proprietors.  Thus,  the  Laboratory  may  structure  some  important  and  successful 
development projects, but land is a vital issue that is, to a large extent, beyond the 
Laboratory’s capacities. It is helpless to solve this affair and in this lays one of the 
major limitations of this initiative. Besides, a landless peasant can hardly manage to 
take  part  in  the  Laboratory’s  programmes  as  it  lacks  a  fundamental  resource  for 
participating in projects. The most excluded are, to some extent, also excluded from the 
Peace Laboratory.  Therefore, the solution to the land problem constitutes, to a large 
degree, a pre-requirement to achieve in a sustainable way the Laboratory’s objectives 
(Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 22). 
Another important aspect of this development and productive dimension of the 
Peace Laboratory is its strategy concerning the illicit drug crops. The Peace Laboratory 
has launched a strategy to address the coca problem. It intends essentially to impulse an 
alternative development, to show, in places such as the Serrania de San Lucas, where 
coca is grown, that there are alternatives (De Roux, 2001). This isn’t done through a 
perspective of forced manual eradication, such as Plan Colombia proposes, but from an 
integral perspective of creating and enlarging the possibilities of development. Even 
tough, at the national scale, Magdalena Medio isn’t one of the major regions of coca 
production, it has some important plantations, which fuel the armed groups and increase 
the  dynamics  of  violence  in  the  region.  Therefore,  it  is  undoubtedly  an  important 
economic, social and political affair to address.  
The most controversial project of the Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio in 
the productive and development field has been probably African palm. It is not only 
criticized by many instances, but it is not even a consensual project within the PDPMM.  
Palm,  in  Colombia  and  in  Magdalena  Medio,  is  linked  with  the  great  land 
owners and paramilitarism. Large areas of land accumulation by the paramilitaries have 
been  cultivating  palm  in  the  region  (Loingsigh,  2005).  Furthermore,  the  model  of 
development which palm conceives and implies is also criticisable and controversial. 
Palm requires a great deal of capital, machinery and large properties, in order to be 
profitable. Besides, it is not an autochthonous good from the region and it produces 
negative environmental effects.  
The most ferocious critics pointed to the Laboratory’s palm projects were made 
by the Irish journalist Gearóid Loingsigh. In a devastating article called “Laboratorios 
de Paz de la Unión Europea: El Plan Colombia de Europa?”, this author criticizes a 
supposed neoliberal model of the initiative, insinuates a relation of the PDPMM with 
the  paramilitary,    and  denounces  economic  and  entrepreneurial  interests  behind  the 
European involvement.   
 Beyond the “theory of conspiracy tone” of the article one must look at these 
critics with some reserve. The PDPMM has involved with palm considering and taking 
into account its economic potential. Palm is a high productivity good, which disposes of 
a  large  exporting  market.  The  PDPMM  perspective  was  that  palm  would  give  the 
possibility to increase the income and the life conditions of the people in a traditionally 
poor  zone.  But  it  has  tried  to  integrate  this  good  on  the  characteristics  of  the 
Programme. The PDPMM has believed that palm is compatible with finca campesina, 
that a palma campesina is possible. That was also the perspective of many peasants, 
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who, in deed, were the authors of this proposal and the ones who requested the project. 
Palm projects would finally be accepted and developed, but within certain conditions. It 
would be based on peasant associative work and communitarian organization, and on 
the division of land and surplus (Bayona, 2007). 
In fact, the palm model the Peace Laboratory defends and has put in place is 
quite  different from  the  other  and  previous  palm  projects  in  the  region.  While  one 
sustains on mega projects, involving large properties, much capital, and has, on many 
occasions, a paramilitary backing (Ibidem), the model which celebrates the PDPMM is 
supported  by  the  peasants  and  the  peasant  organizations  and  is  based  on  small 
cultivations and small peasant properties united in cooperatives (CDPMM, 2001:14). It 
is a model which directly supports the peasants. It intends precisely to be a containment 
measure against land concentration and forced displacement (Mojica, 2007). These are 
two  well  distinct  dynamics  which  cross  the  same  territory.  They  may  have 
interconnections  and  similarities,  but  they  are  surely  of  a  different  nature. 
Notwithstanding,  the  large  amounts  of  capital,  land  and  machinery  these  projects 
require can  make one wonder about its  sustainability and applicability as a  peasant 
model. Besides, its negative effects for the environment cannot be framed within the 
Peace Laboratory’s proclaimed concept of sustainable development.  
Concerning Loingsigh’s second critic, the palm association with the paramilitary 
may represent an indirect and unwanted connection between the Laboratory and the 
paramilitaries. However, a link or association between the two is completely unfunded 
and untenable. The PDPMM and its staff are above suspicion of sympathies with the 
paramilitary. On the contrary, if there has been a great threat to the PDPMM and the 
Peace Laboratory’s projects are the paramilitaries.  
Regarding the supposed European entrepreneurial interest in Magdalena Medio 
it seems also not quite to match the Peace Laboratory’s reality. An increasing European 
investment and economic interest in Colombia is undeniable and even explicit on the 
European  Union’s  involvement  in  this  country.  Yet,  it  doesn’t  appear  to  be  the 
primordial  objective  or  driving  force  behind  this  initiative.  The  Peace  Laboratory 
constitutes a European support to a peacebuilding Colombian experience. There are no 
major or relevant European economic interests at stake in Magdalena Medio. Besides, 
the economic model the Peace Laboratory is based on sustains on the region’s peasant 
economy,  not  on  a  free  market  or  free  trade  which  could  benefit  the  European 
companies and economy. However, as Manuel Bayona (2007). refers, “with or without 
PDPMM  the  region  is  attractive  for  the  international  capitalism;  with  or  without 
PDPMM the mines of Magdalena Medio are attractive for the mining multinationals; 
with  or  without  PDPMM  the  oil  is  important  for  the  foreign  companies
43.”  An 
entrepreneurial  interest  in  Magdalena  Medio  is  evident.  There  are  even  European 
companies involved in it. However, this initiative based on the PDPMM and supported 
by the European Commission serves different purposes rather than those. “The PDPMM 
has never been at the disposal of the foreign capital. On the contrary...” (Bayona, 2007). 
The primordial interest is peace, not new European markets.  
In fact, the greatest interrogation concerning these development projects lays on 
its  sustainability.  Can  these  experiences  survive  in  a  globalization  era?  Are  they 
sustainable facing the macroeconomic neoliberal policies of the country? Can a peasant 
traditional economy survive on these days? Is the Peace Laboratory economic model a 
real alternative? Is it feasible?  
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From the economic point of view, one of the original and peculiar elements of 
the PDPMM and the Peace Laboratory lays on its peculiar mixture of tradition and the 
market, of peasant economy and capitalism. It is difficult to place it on a theoretical 
level. It is not a capitalistic model. But it is not a peasant model either, such as the 
FARC defends (Bayona, 2007). Between the excluding globalization model based on 
the multinational corporations and a fragile peasant economy, the Laboratory searches 
an intermediate model, a model where the peasants develop their development proposals 
(Vargas,  2007).  The  Laboratory  seeks  to  try  finding  solutions  for  the  traditional 
economies and to try making them profitable. For Bayona (2007), products such as 
rubber, cacao or african palm have shown that it is possible to continue with traditional 
cultivations  and  peasant  farms  and  have  a  market  which  allows  to  have  important 
incomes.  
This configures a peculiar economic model for the Peace Laboratory. There is 
not a clear and explicit model of development within the Peace Laboratory. There are 
elements  of  different  things.  On  some  of  its  documents,  namely  by  the  support  to 
traditional economy, it seems to suggest an anti-capitalist or socialist tendency. Yet, the 
Peace Laboratory doesn’t deny profit and recognizes the possibilities of the market. 
There are also explicit critics to Neoliberalism within the Peace Laboratory and PDMM 
documents and staff. This could configure a sort of social democratic tendency within 
the Peace Laboratory concepts. But it certainly is not an explicit one.  
The  economic  model  of  the  Peace  Laboratory  is  manifestly  one  which  has 
another perspective rather then economic growth or the mere income creation. It is a 
conception of development as an ethical posture (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 25). As 
Christian Wlaschütz (2007) puts it, “what we defend is a development which allows to 
live with dignity, a development in which the peasants have their land and instruments 
to grow”.  
In that sense it has much to do with the concept of human development, as the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines it. For the UNDP (2007),  
 
“Human  development  is  about  much  more  than  the  rise  or  fall  of  national 
incomes. It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their 
full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and 
interests.  People  are  the  real  wealth  of  nations.  Development  is  thus  about 
expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value. And it is thus 
about much more than economic growth, which is only a means —if a very 
important one —of enlarging people’s choices”. 
 
It is a sort of development which recognizes the human person as the central axis 
of development. The Peace Laboratory conveys a “development policy” built with the 
participation of the person, as beneficiary and protagonist. It is a development defined 
as a social, economic, cultural and political process (Katz, 2004: 30). It represents an 
integral view of development. It is based on “sustainable integral development, through 
integral projects” (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 26). 
One can also identify in the Peace Laboratory’s model of development a certain 
influence of the Nobel Prize for Economic Science Amartya Sen and his conception of 
“Development  as  Freedom”.  This  Indian  economist  has  emphasized  a  close  link 
between  freedom  and  the  process  of  development.  For  him,  political  freedom  and 
economic  freedom  are  intimately  interconnected.  Sen  (1999)  views  economic 
development and wealth as a means to extending freedoms rather than an end in itself. 
Development is portrayed as a qualitative enhancement of human freedoms and as the   30 
expansion of capabilities. It goes way beyond income generation. But development is 
also  described  as  an  unlikely  and  unsustainable  process  in  the  absence  of  political 
liberty and democracy. The Laboratory takes much of this view. It constitutes a support 
to  the  people  to  develop  its  own  capabilities  and  freedoms  (Bayona,  2007). 
Furthermore, it is based on a perspective which underlines the political dimension of 
development and development dimension of peace.  
Therefore, we are looking at a quite peculiar, curious and interesting model of 
development. Its concepts are new and alternative in the region. It represents a new and 
original economic proposal. However, one must emphasize that the Peace Laboratory 
finds  essentially  its  value  and  importance  on  the  concepts  it  proposes  and  on  its 
alternative  form  of  building  development.  The  resources  it  leads  with  are  few  and, 
therefore, it can’t have the pretension to truly impulse the development of the region. 
“Its  contribution  is  on  sowing  a  seed  with  a  focus  of  an  inclusive,  sustainable  and 
human development.
44” (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 28) The Peace Laboratory per se 
won’t definitely change the region’s economic structures.  
 
 
4.  The  articulation  between  the  micro  and  the  macro  level:  a  national 
impact of the Peace Laboratory?  
 
Every local place develops itself in a interaction dialectic and in articulation with 
wider spaces, structures and levels (Garcia, 2007: 5). One of the crucial issues for the 
Peace Laboratory is the relation between its inherent micro level and a macro level. Its 
success depends to a large extent on its articulation with the macro level, that is, on its 
national impact and contribution to the conflict resolution. In fact, in order to survive, 
peace initiatives require a coordination between the high, the medium and the low level 
of peacebuilding (Mcdonald, 1997: 28).  
The  Peace  Laboratory  has  explicitly  a  macro  dimension  in  its  logic  and 
objectives. Despite being in essence a micro level initiative, it articulates and intends to 
articulate with the mezzo and the macro levels. The experience is intrinsically local: it 
was born in Magdalena Medio; it was structured for Magdalena Medio; it grew up in 
this region. Moreover, it concentrates essentially on the municipalities and has, as its 
driving  force,  micro  units,  such  as  the  núcleos  de  pobladores  and  the  peasants’ 
communities.  Nonetheless, the Laboratory logic is that there has to be an articulation 
between the local, the regional, the national and the international. The articulation is 
made by the different level actors that the Laboratory involves and includes and by the 
different level dynamics it creates and absorbs. There are local, regional, national and 
international organisations in the process, which go from local peasant organisations to 
the  European  Commission.  The  Peace  Laboratory  is  simultaneously  drawn  between 
Brussels, Bogotá, Barrancabermeja and each of Magdalena Medio’s municipalities. The 
levels cross and interlink. And they have two ways.  The are both bottom-up and top-
down dynamics.  
This articulation is also based on the Laboratory’s objectives. Placing itself on 
the micro level, it has macro level objectives. It intends to have repercussions on the 
macro  level.  It  seeks  to  have  a  national  impact.  Fundamentally,  the  Laboratory  of 
Magdalena  Medio  seeks  to  be  an  exploratory  and  pilot  experiment  at  a  local  and 
regional level, which can be replicated at other regions of the country and at a national 
level.  
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To some extent, this has been done through the expansion of the experience of 
the Peace Laboratory and the Peace and Development Programme to other regions of 
Colombia.  Following  the  successful  and  original  experience  of  Magdalena  Medio, 
several  other  Peace  and  Development  Programmes  have  been  created,  covering 
presently most of the country. There has been a true boom of peace and development 
programmes  (PDP)  (Gutierrez,  2007).  We  can  count  18  PDPs  at  the  moment. 
Furthermore, a second and a third Peace Laboratory have been launched in the regions 
of Norte Santander, Oriente Antioqueño, Cauca-Nariño, Meta and Montes de Maria
45, 
presenting similar objectives, methodologies and concepts.  
Magdalena  Medio  has  served  as  a  model  and  school  for  the  different  other 
Programmes and Laboratories. It is the starting point of the philosophy which sustains 
the other Laboratories. Yet, whether this peculiar and original peacebuilding initiative 
born in Magdalena Medio is reproducible in other regions constitutes a main issue and 
interrogation.   
In  this  context  and  framework,  another  national  impact  of  the  PDPMM  and 
Peace Laboratory was the creation of Red Prodepaz in 2002 (Vargas, 2007). This is a 
national  network  which  gathers  the  various  peace  and  development  programmes.  It 
intends to be a space of exchange of experiences and articulation of processes and a 
place where the nation is thought through the light of the different regions (Saavedra 
and Ojeda, 2006: 17). It is a highly important initiative in terms of the integration of the 
micro  level  with  the  macro  level  and  a  visible  contribute  to  a  national  impact  and 
dimension of the peace and development programmes.   
But, above all, an actor is vital on the articulation between the micro and the 
macro level – the state. The Peace Laboratory constitutes, to a large amount, a space of 
dialogue between the civil society of Magdalena Medio and the state. It is a pioneer 
initiative in this field. The state ultimately represents the macro level. Therefore, its role 
is determinant. 
Within this process the state has allowed this initiative to strengthen at a national 
level. It has empowered much of the processes. And it has facilitated the articulation 
and the international contacts with the EU (Herrera 2007). In fact, the state increasingly 
views with some sympathy the Laboratories and the Programmes (Gonzalez, 2007b). 
Evidence of this and of a success in terms of national impact has been the inclusion in 
the last years by the national government of a support to the Peace and Development 
Programmes in the National Development Plan
46 
47. Notwithstanding, this inclusion was 
made  on  the  Chapter  of  Democratic  Security,  which  caused  some  tensions  and 
controversy within the PDPMM, as the Programme is highly skeptical and critical of 
this government policy. 
In fact, this relation with the state is a source of some problems, issues and 
tensions. The state, although participating in it, and giving an important support and 
backing to the process, has not truly subscribed it. To a large degree, the Laboratory’s 
proposals, concept and philosophy are incompatible and contrary to Uribe’s democratic 
security policy and its macro-economic policies. It is difficult to implement a Peace 
Laboratory as the government, in its official speech, denies the conflict and reduces it to 
an action against terrorism and drug traffic (Campo, 2005: 48). As Eliecer Soto (2007) 
tells, “there were projects which “stayed freezed” for months because Acción Social 
refused  to  sign  documents  which  spoke  about  social  and  armed  conflict  and 
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humanitarian emergence”
48. 
It is also hard to put across an alternative development while macroeconomic 
policies of a much different kind run the country. While the Peace Laboratory focus on 
finca  campesina,  traditional  production  and  small farms,  the  model  of  development 
conveyed by the state is centered on extensive cultivations, agroindustry, liberalization 
and neoliberal reforms (Bayona, 2007).     
Thus, even tough the state is an important part of the Laboratory its approach 
towards conflict resolution is manifestly of a different kind.  
That configures one of the main limitations of the Laboratory. It is a vital issue 
for the process. It will determine, to a large extent, the Laboratory’s success and impact.  
The greatest challenge for the Laboratory is to pass from its micro level to the national 
level. It can have an extraordinary micro success. But, if the state does not assume the 
Programme, if the town halls don’t accept it, if it is not incorporated in the national 
planning,  if  the  national  and  regional  institutions  do  not  provide  alternatives,  the 
projects will ultimately fail, because they are not integrated in the national development 
and the national policies (Gonzalez, 2007b).  These experiences can only be sustainable 
if  they  are  converted  into  public  policies.  If  they  are  islands,  they  can  easily  be 
submerged. They need to be surrounded by an  institutionality beyond the local and 
micro  level,  through  the  government,  the  ministries,  the  department  governors,  the 
Office of the Attorney-General. Otherwise, they remain very weak (Bayona, 2007). In 
fact, the state is one of the main targets and interlocutors of the Peace Laboratory.  
These are, to a large extent, proposals to the institutionality. That’s the reason why in its 
components  and  strategic  lines,  the  Peace  Laboratory  gives  a  strong  emphasis  to 
institutional building and backing.  
In this  regard, the state attitude  concerning the PDPMM and  the  Laboratory 
passed from a low interest and even a certain mistrust, at the beginning, to a growing 
involvement and interest. It realized a certain potential and usefulness in this initiative 
in terms of lowering the violence in the territories (Bertolini, 2007). For the government 
and Acción Social the PDPMM and the Peace Laboratory have become, to some degree, 
part of its strategy of intervention in the conflict zones. As Vice-President Francisco 
Santos affirmed, the PDPMM represents possibilities for building alliances between the 
state and the civil society in areas of conflict (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 49).  
However, one must say that there are no visible signs that this initiative can have 
a true impact in Bogotá, that it can transform the government’s public policies in terms 
of peace and development.  
Besides,  the  increasing  governmental  interest  in  the  PDPMM  and  the  Peace 
Laboratory entails a risk. There is a danger of cooptation of the dynamic by the state. 
The state has an interest in controlling the process and use it for its purposes
49. It has 
attempted  to  impose  its  political  criteria.  It  has  pushed,  for  instance,  the  Peace 
Laboratory to support and canalize resources to its familia guardabosques program
50 
and the DDR
51 process with the AUC. The PDPMM and the EU opposed to both, due to 
divergent  perspectives  on  the  matters  and  reserves  concerning  this  governmental 
programs.  
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Therefore, there are permanent tensions and a daily disputed dialogue between 
these actors. “What we have in Magdalena Medio is a product of a continuous process 
of  discussion”  (Bayona,  2007).  The  PDPMM  struggles  not  to  lose  its  autonomy 
(Herrera, 2007) and its leadership in the process. Yet, there is a certain preoccupation 
from its part not to lose the state support from a political and financial point of view, 
which  could  represent  a  certain  risk  of  losing  some  of  its  independence.  The  state 
participation has meant some concessions by the PDPMM. Nonetheless, it seems clear 
that the PDPMM has firm objectives and concepts and a highly motivated and militant 
staff, which could hardly change its views and principles.  
Another key aspect of the Peace Laboratory relation with the state is of a rather 
different kind. It is a distinct type of risk. The Peace Laboratory can, involuntarily or 
not, become a substitute to the state. Some of the Laboratory projects work on areas of 
welfare  which  are  of  a  responsibility  of  the  state.  Should,  for  instance,  the  Peace 
Laboratory  invest,  in  schooling,  health,  roads,  aqueducts,  environment  and  public 
services, which constitute functions and duties for the state and the local powers to 
fulfill? Can’t the Peace Laboratory turn out this way to be a sort of parallel or para-
state? This would mean, additionally, that the Peace Laboratory would contribute, in 
some degree, to a fragilization of the state, which constitutes one of the structural causes 
of the conflict it attempts to address. In this sense, the cure would become part of the 
disease.  
Besides, from the state point of view, the fact that international aid and the civil 
society are fulfilling, in some cases, its role entails the risk that the state lowers its 
social investment in these areas (Soto, 2007). This would be highly problematic, as 
social development cannot be generated uniquely by development aid. Yet, this is a risk 
which has not been much detected so far.  
It is also evident that this substituting role of the Peace Laboratory is, to a large 
amount,  a  consequence  of  the  absence  of  the  state  and  public  services  in  some 
territories. And, therefore, it does not truly represent a substitution in many cases, but a 
fulfillment of a void. Nevertheless, the Peace Laboratory has been attempting to involve 
the local, regional and national institutions on its projects and programs. In this way, it 
has been contributing more to the strengthening of the state and the institutions, rather 
than to its weakening.  
Above  all,  the  Peace  Laboratory  aims  at  establishing  a  kind  of  new  social 
contract, in which the state can be a guarantee of the public interest and social cohesion 
(Katz, 2004: 34). It attempts to create a new society and a new country in peace and 
development. To a certain extent, it has been doing it in a micro level. To do it on a 
macro level remains an extremely difficult and thorny task. 
 
5. The Peace Laboratory’s assessment and impact:   
 
Considering  that  the  Peace  Laboratory  intends  to  be  an  experiment  and  an 
alternative  of  peacebuilding,  it  is  politically  and  socially  important  to  assess  and 
evaluate its impact at a micro and macro level. 
However, we face a problem in this respect. To evaluate the impact of the Peace 
Laboratory represents a complicated task.  It is extremely difficult to assess it. A variety 
of  reasons sets hurdles on that task.  First and foremost, it is the complexity of the 
conflict and  the  multitude  of factors that  influence  and  intervene  in  it  that make  it 
difficult to evaluate the Laboratory’s action (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 40). The 
armed  conflict  is a  multi-causal event. Many factors interfere in  its dynamics. And 
qualitative  indicators  are  insufficient  and  inadequate  to  explain  multi-causal  events.   34 
Moreover, being the conflict a national phenomenon, it is hard to evaluate a regional 
impact without taking into account the big picture, i.e., the national framework of the 
conflict And, in effect, “as long as illegal groups keep on fighting, there can be no 
absolute  peace  locally”    (Banfield  et  al,  2006:  83).  In  addition,  the  conventional 
instruments of impact measurement cannot capture the vast qualitative dimension of the 
Peace Laboratory. (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 41).  
According to the OPI, one can notice a positive evolution of Magdalena Medio’s 
regional indicators: violence levels have decreased in the last years; kidnappings have 
lowered;  the  regional  aggregated  value  of  income  has  increased;  there  has  been  a 
decrease of the coca production. However, to what extent may we give the Laboratory 
credit for that? What was its contribution? What role did it play in this process and 
evolution?  
It is hard to tell. It is difficult to access and measure to what degree the Peace 
Laboratory has contributed to that or  if it has contributed at all. Violence is multi-
causal. And development is a complex process. It doesn’t obviously depend only on the 
Laboratory’s action. Many actors influence it – the security forces, the army, the state, 
the armed groups, the town parishes, the church… There is not a linear cause-effect 
relation. There are many factors and elements at stake.  
In terms of violence, the confrontation curve has been decreasing in the last 
years. There has been a long term diminution of violence, at a national and Magdalena 
Medio level. But we can’t attribute it to the Laboratory. One has to take into account 
elements such as Uribe’s national war strategy, which has diminished some territorial 
influence  of  the  guerrillas,  and  the  on-going  DDR  process  with  the  paramilitaries 
(Vargas, 2007).   
Development is also contingent to many factors (Banfield et al, 2006: 83).  It is a 
process  which  has  to  do  with  micro  decisions,  macro  economic  policies,  economic 
conjunctures, market dynamics, and even globalization. 
Moreover, with such small projects as the ones the Laboratory deals with, it is 
arguable to affirm that it has influenced violence and development. As the Colombian 
economist Jorge Ivan Gonzalez (2007b) puts it, 42 million euros cannot transform a 
region like Magdalena Medio. The resources the Laboratory deals with are small. It is a 
large  amount in  development aid terms,  but it represents very little on  the  regional 
economy. Comparing it to Barrancabermeja’s municipal budget, to the regional income, 
to the coca economy, to the oil money, it represents cents. “It is irrational to think that 
the laboratory will transform the region’s structures” (Gonzalez, 2007b). 
The Laboratory’s impact is thus obviously marginal. It may have an influence on 
some of Magdalena Medio’s indicators and events; it may play a very important role in 
the region; it may have a visible impact within some communities and fulfil a deeply 
laudable and meaningful task. However, its impact is necessarily limited and its true 
contribution a complex topic.  
In addition, it is premature to consistently evaluate the Laboratory. Its action is 
recent. And, despite being structured for only a few years, there is a long term logic 
inherent to the Peace Laboratory. The structural problems the Laboratory intends to 
address cannot be resolved within a few years. A region cannot be easily transformed. 
So, its impact is hard to be assessed on the short term.  
Notwithstanding, there have been evaluations. Reports have been regularly made 
and written. This is, specially, an European requirement. Accountability is important for 
the EU. It has a concern in knowing how its resources are used, to analyse the regional 
indicators  evolution  and  to  show  that  its  action  generated  impact.  However,  this 
generates  tensions  within  the  Peace  Laboratory.  It  represents  a  bureaucratic  and   35 
technical struggle between the PDPMM and the EU. The Programme has a different 
logic. It is reluctant to attempt measuring  its impact.  Its emphasis is on the social, 
political and economic learning processes the Laboratory generates (Vargas, 2007). Yet, 
although this perspective is coherent and suits the Peace Laboratory objectives well, we 
cannot deny the need and the importance to try to find and analyse, with more or less 
accuracy, the Laboratory multilevel impacts. It is vital for this initiative auto-reflexion, 
to empower the experience, to analyse the projects’ strengths and malfunctions and to 
be an example and a referral to other regions and initiatives in Colombia.    
In fact, although it is difficult to evaluate the Peace Laboratory impact, one can 
make a few qualitative observations concerning its successes and failures: 
Above all, there is a remarkable micro success. As Jorge Ivan Gonzalez tells, “it 
is  moving  to  hear  the  peasants  speak  about  the  Programme.  […]  In  an  absolutely 
exasperating world of war, the Programme has aroused the peasants and given them 
expectations”
52.  In  fact,  within  the  contexts  of  poor  and  vulnerable  population  the 
Laboratory deals with, 42 million euros may represent a lot of money (Ibidem).  
This micro success is visible principally on a productive farming impact. This 
quantitative dimension of the Laboratory is easier to read and to measure (Rudqvist and 
Van Sluys, 2005: 9). In reality, the EU’s involvement with the Laboratory has allowed, 
with  the  injection  of  much  more  resources  in  the  process,  to  support  productive 
activities and social and economic facilities the Programme hadn’t the chance to support 
previously. It represents an important economic support.  
In terms of conflict dynamics, another visible success was the Humanitarian 
Spaces project. These have become true instruments of civil resistance to the armed 
actors. The Laboratory gave communities which live in very difficult zones the chance 
to survive, to keep organised and to prevent forced displacement. In fact, even tough 
violence is far from having disappeared from the region, the Laboratory has contributed 
to protect the civil society and empower its organisations (Kurtenbach, 2005: 11). No 
“islands of peace” of been established with the Peace Laboratory and the Humanitarian 
Spaces, but some accomplishments have been reached in terms of conflict dynamics.  
In this framework, the European political support to the process has been of 
much importance.  The EU, as an international actor, is viewed with some respect and 
carefulness by the armed groups (Vargas, 2007). Its involvement has served as a kind of 
a political shield to the Laboratory.  It has, to some extent, offered some protection to its 
activities and organizations. The armed actors are aware that attempting against Peace 
Laboratory employees provokes a direct reaction form the EU. As some people related 
to the Laboratory have told, “those yellow stars cannot be underestimated.  They have 
some power. They give some protection”. 
But  Church  also  plays  a  crucial  role  in  terms  of  political  shielding.  This 
institution enjoys a status and credibility with no comparison in all Colombian society. 
The armed actors, with no exception, show respect for the Church and its men and 
women.  Thus,  being  the  Peace  Laboratory  and  the  PDPMM,  to  a  large  extent,  a 
peacebuilding  initiative  lead  and  managed  by  catholic  priests,  this  has  given  some 
protection and immunity to the Peace Laboratory initiatives and staff.  
Additionally,  the  Peace Laboratory  has  played  a  very  important  cultural  and 
social  role.  It  has  empowered  civil  society,  stimulated  popular  participation,  and 
allowed marginalized social sectors, like women and peasants, to become more visible. 
As CINEP’s researcher Omar Gutierrez (2007) refers, “the Programme has become a 
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reference for many sectors of Magdalena Medio”
53. More than seventy communitarian 
organizations (Saavedra and Ojeda, 2006: 57) and one hundred thousand people have 
beneficiated from the PDPMM in this territory (De Roux, 2007).  Moreover, it has 
stimulated  a  change  of  attitudes  among  the  people  towards  negotiation,  peace  and 
tolerance (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005: 41), and has amplified the civic capacity and 
awareness of the citizens.  
Another clear sign of the Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio’s success has 
been the expansion of this experience with a second and a third Peace Laboratory in 
other  regions  of  Colombia.  It constitutes  obvious  evidence  that  for the  EU, for  the 
Colombian state and for other regions of the country the initiative is successful and 
desired. 
However, there are also a few problematic elements in the Laboratory’s action. 
Some problems, blockades and interrogation shade its success and impact.  
Firstly,  there  is  a  technical  and  administrative  problem.  One  of  the  most 
criticised aspects of the Peace Laboratory is its bureaucracy. There have been manifest 
problems concerning the projects’s execution. The flow of resources has not fulfilled 
the previewed deadlines. The implementation of the projects has been slow (Rudqvist 
and Van Sluys, 2005: 32). The European Union has been particularly criticised in this 
matter. It has been accused of having introduced, from Brussels, very rigid, inflexible 
and complicated norms. In fact, the European Commission standardized package of 
procedures contrasts with the flexible methodology of the Programme. Principally, the 
European system of public convocation is incoherent and contrary to the PDPMM’s 
open methodology  of participation. To some  degree, this method has disrupted and 
distorted the Programme’s dynamics, as it has limited the people’s participation, due to 
inability to formulate projects and manage the heavy European bureaucracy (Herrera, 
2007).   
This top-down aid logic has motivated heavy critics, such as the ones by former 
CINEP  director  Priest  Alejandro  Angulo  (2005),  who  has  described  the  European 
cooperation as a form of neo-colonialism, denouncing a “complex of superiority” of the 
EU, its procedural impositions and its technocratic mentality. Nevertheless, one must 
say  that,  despite  some methodological  impositions,  the  majority  of  the  people  have 
emphasized the autonomy the EU has allowed the PDPMM to have to lead the process 
and manage the resources within the Peace Laboratory and the European respect for the 
civil society dynamics. 
 A second problematic topic relates to the Laboratory’s productive dimension. 
The  Peace  Laboratory  faces  a  critical  risk.  There  is  a  certain  dominance  of  the 
development and productive component of the Laboratory over the peace component. 
The majority of the Laboratory’s projects are on productive and facilities fields and not 
on peace, institutional building and integral rights projects (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 
2005: 32). This may generate a severe unbalance and a distortion on the Laboratory’s 
goals. The Laboratory may turn into a mere development process and a regular aid 
project. This configures the risk that the Peace Laboratory may become everything but a 
peace  laboratory,  or  convert  into  a  simple  development  laboratory.  In  reality,  an 
excessive focus on the economic dimension doesn’t suit the multidimensional concept 
of peace the Laboratory intends to set. Peace is economic, but it is much more than that. 
Notwithstanding, one must stress that the Peace Laboratory has brought an increment of 
the political projects of the PDPMM and that a high peacebuilding focus is manifest on 
its objectives and projects.  
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Another troubling aspect for the Peace Laboratory action and projects concerns 
its security. It represents one of the most important problems the Laboratory has to deal 
with. Without security, it is hard for a project to succeed. In a situation of violence, 
economic  blockade  and  instability  it  is  difficult  to  put  projects  in  practice.  Serious 
security problems have menaced the viability and sustainability of the Laboratory in 
these  regions.  The  armed  actors  view  with  suspicion  the  PDPMM  and  the  Peace 
Laboratory.  The  guerrillas  have  sometimes  seen  it  as  part  of  a  counter-insurgency 
strategy and the paramilitaries as part of a pro-insurgency strategy (Vargas, 2007). In a 
highly polarised country and conflict, there is very little space for alternative logics and 
approaches. Besides, the state participation in the processes is a source of more doubts 
and mistrust from the part of the guerrillas. So, the relation between the Laboratory and 
the armed groups has always been a tense one. People working with the Laboratory 
have been accused of being sympathisers to both parts of the conflict and threatened 
because  of  that.  There  have  been  cases  of  violence  against  Peace  Laboratory 
participants (De Roux, 2005: 40). People have been killed, kidnapped and threatened, 
both by the guerrillas and the paramilitary. There have been more than 20 casualties so 
far (Ibidem, 43).  
The  Paramilitaries,  in  particular,  have  constituted  a  great  menace  to  the 
Laboratory’s  projects  and  personnel.  They  view  civic  and  social  mobilization  as 
expressions  of  support  to  the  insurgency.  Therefore,  the  paramilitary  strategy  has 
considered the social movements in Magdalena Medio as military targets (Paez, 2006).  
The Organizacion Femenina Popular (OFP), a feminist organization which works in 
supporting women during this time of war and has been a Peace Laboratory beneficiary, 
is a good example of it. Its director and several members have been systematically 
threatened of death and have been object of violence (Pax Christi, 2006).  
This constitutes a clear drawback for the Laboratory. It represents one the main 
threats to it. An insurgent or counter insurgent offensive against the Peace Laboratory 
could put in risk its own existence.  
In fact, one notices that the conflict dynamics are deeply rooted and still very 
visible in the region. And the Laboratory has found difficulty in appeasing them, even if 
in some places, within some communities and to some levels we can do say that the 
Laboratory has contributed to the diminution of violence (Vargas, 2007).  
Nevertheless,  the  armed  groups  accept  and  tolerate,  to  some  degree,  the 
Laboratory. They  recognise its social work at the local level and that their projects 
benefit the population. Moreover, the European and Church involvement have shielded, 
to some degree, its dynamics and projects.  
Another trend reflects this relative acceptance of the Laboratory. In some zones 
and some circumstances, the armed groups have attempted to co-opt the Laboratory 
(Herrera,  2007).  The  paramilitaries,  in  particular,  have  tried  to  make  use  of  the 
Laboratory and the Programme and manipulate them for their profit and objectives. In 
other cases, they have created parallel organizations with similar names, intending to 
show to the people that they can do the same work the PDPMM does and that they are 
the  real  alternative  (Soto,  2007).  This  dynamic  hasn’t  affected  the  Laboratory’s 
processes and concepts much. Besides, it is impossible for the Laboratory to completely 
prevent it, as the Laboratory intends to be open and participated space and to create 
peace  with  all  kind  of  social  actors  and  organisations.  The  contact  between  the 
Laboratory  and  the  armed  groups  is  inevitable  in  a  context  of  conflict  and 
peacebuilding. And in many cases it is necessary. Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
establish projects (Herrera, 2007).     38 
In this context of insecurity and illegal armed groups threats, some people ask 
for a stronger European political position and commitment and for a pressure on the 
Colombian government, which could bring more security to the processes. Many have 
accused the EU of not having firmly reacted when Laboratory people have been victims 
of violence and threats and when human rights have been systematically violated in the 
region by the illegal armed groups or the army (Bayona, 2007). In fact, on several 
occasions, the European Union has preferred to privilege its diplomatic relations with 
the Colombian government, rather than to create diplomatic tensions, manifesting some 
lack of political will to firmly and unconditionally support this peacebuilding initiative. 
Notwithstanding, some declarations have been made and a productive political dialogue 
with the Colombian government is regularly taken.  
Nevertheless,  a  stronger  criticism  regarding  the  EU  participation  on  the 
Laboratory focuses on another aspect: the idealism of the European peace aid is viewed 
with some reluctance by many. The fact that Colombia has become an important place 
for European investment in the last years has made some people look at its development 
aid as being an extension of European enterprise interests (Herrera, 2007). Concerning 
this critic, there is some ground for this argument, but only to some extent. It seems 
evident that Europe has an interest in investing in Colombia and that the existence of 
stable conditions in the country is important for this goal. This can play a role and be a 
motivation for the European development aid policy and its peace approach. Former 
European Commissioner Chris Patten has referred to it explicitly
54 (apud Loingsigh, 
2005). However, it doesn’t appear to be its primordial concern or motivation. This is a 
quite cynical and political realist view. In fact, there are no major interests in stake for 
Europe  in  Colombia.  The  Peace  Laboratory  doesn’t  seem  to  hide  vested  interests. 
Besides, Europe’s political involvement in Colombia was motivated, to a large extent, 
by a Colombian call, both by Andrès Pastrana “peace diplomacy”, which requested 
European countries to participate in the peace processes with the FARC and the ELN, 
and by the PDPMM,  which invited the EU to support the Magdalena Medio peace 
initiatives. In addition, the Ingrid Betancur case has given also the EU a strong political 
motivation for an European involvement in conflict resolution in Colombia. Thus, the 
European approach can be considered a mixture of both realism and idealism.  
Finally,  another  element  which  menaces  the  Peace  Laboratory’s  projects  is 
related to its sustainability and viability. Is it viable to implement a peasant traditional 
economy and productions in this day and age? Its survival in a competitive market 
economy and globalized economy cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, serious 
doubts can be raised concerning it. The Peace Laboratory can show alternative paths of 
development,  but  surely  cannot  change  the  characteristics  of  capitalism.  And  the 
macroeconomic policies in force in Colombia go precisely in the opposite direction. 
Truly, to support and strengthen the local peasant economies constitutes an enormous 
challenge for the PDPMM and the Laboratory.  
Moreover, there is the risk that some economic and productive projects cannot 
resist and survive when the financing will end, going thus back to the status quo ante. 
The  temporal  horizon  of  the  Peace  Laboratory  is  only  of  8  years,  even  tough  the 
European Commission has manifested its will to keep financing some programmes and 
projects  in  the  region  (Bertolini,  2007).  There  is  a  strong  concern  and  an  explicit 
objective  within  the  Peace  Laboratory  and  the  PDPMM  that  its  projects  reach 
sustainability. As Christian Wlaschütz (2007), affirms, “our concept of development is 
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not to give fish, but to teach how to catch fish”
55.  However, this risk of unsustainability 







As recognised by the European Commission (2001b) Country Strategy Paper, 
the Peace Laboratories are the EU’s primary development aid instrument in Colombia. 
In fact, of all the EU development aid projects in this country, it is beyond doubt the 
most ambitious one (Francia, 2003). But the Peace Laboratories have become not only 
EU’s principal development aid instrument, but also the core of a EU peace approach to 
Colombia, based on efforts to facilitate a political negotiated solution to the conflict and 
on the definition of a structural conflict resolution strategy, carried by addressing the 
root causes of the conflict.  
It represents a very original experience of peacebuilding. It truly corresponds to 
a peace laboratory. It seeks new paths to peace, an alternative form of peacebuilding, in 
a country which  desperately  needs new  and imaginative solutions in  order to reach 
peace and which lives an impasse on the national peace processes.  
Essentially, the Laboratory is a proposal, a seed. It tries to show at the micro 
level a peace and development alternative solution. That proposal can be accepted or not 
on the mezzo and macro level. It’s up to the Colombian state, to the local authorities, to 
the  armed  groups  and  to  the  Colombian  society  to  do  it  or  not.  If  they  don’t,  the 
Laboratory impact is limited, (Gonzalez, 2007b), or merely localized. 
In  fact,  the  key  to  the  Laboratory  success  or  failure  lies  on  the  articulation 
between its micro level and the macro level. It will determine to a large extent the 
Laboratory’s impact. It is its greatest challenge.  
In this framework, the state plays a crucial role. Despite its participation and 
backing to the process, it hasn’t truly embraced the experience and its concepts. The 
public policies and the governmental approach to the conflict and development go in 
divergent ways as the Peace Laboratory proposals. While this happens, it can turn out to 
be a Sisyphean task to try to create peace and development in Magdalena Medio. Or it 
may become a mere palliative or a rhetoric of peace cradle.  
However, one must emphasize that the Peace Laboratory is mainly a symbolic 
initiative. It aims at showing that it is possible to build another model of peace and 
development, to create another type of institutions, another form of state, another form 
of life (Vargas, 2007). To some extent, it attempts to put in practice, on a micro level, 
the alter-globalists slogan “another world is possible”. It intends to show that another 
Magdalena Medio is possible, another Colombia is possible, another peace is possible.  
It has a certain utopian character. It truly corresponds to what Fetherston calls counter-
hegemonic peacebuilding projects (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 217).  
But it is clear that the Laboratory, put before the gravity of the situation, is not 
enough  to  solve  the  Colombian  conflict  (Palechor,  2005:  45).    It  has  essentially  a 
symbolic  and  demonstrative  value.  It  can’t  substitute  a  peace  process  and  national 
negotiations, essential for the peace in the country. It does not even correspond to an 
island of peace. It didn’t suppress the conflict dynamics in the region, nor does it has the 
capacity to do it. 
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However,  it  constitutes  a  very  important,  interesting  and  innovative 
peacebuilding initiative. The PDPMM and the Peace Laboratory were visionary and 
pioneers  in  attempting  to  marry  and  combine  peace  and  development  in  a  same 
programme and in opening a state – civil society dialogue. This relates to the Peace 
Laboratory’s broad concept of peace. The Laboratory is simultaneously a peace and 
development proposal. It sustains on an integral approach. It has multidisciplinary focus 
and a participative methodology. It is based on an attempt to address the structural root 
causes of the conflict at a micro and regional level.  
All  in  all,  the  Peace  Laboratory  conveys  an  alternative,  more  complex  and 
complete conflict resolution perspective as other actors in the region, such as the US 
(Maio-Coliche, 2005: 37) or such as the governmental democratic security policies. Its 
identification and analysis of the problems is correct, its conceptual framework and 
objectives are daring and its suggested methods are coherent (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 
2005: 52). It is an European alternative to Plan Colombia. It focuses on the causes of the 
conflict, rather than on its consequences; it is a plan for peace, not a plan for war, even 
if at the productive level one can identify some similarities between the European and 
the American aid and strategy.   
Moreover,  for  the  EU,  the  experience  of  the  Peace  Laboratory  attests  an 
European political commitment to peace on a global scale, even outside its “normal” 
geographic area of intervention and influence, and in a region where no major interests 
are at stake.  
It  also  represents  the  creation  of  new  peacebuilding  instruments  in  the 
framework of development aid policies (despite the fact that in this case it isn’t the main 
author).  The  Peace  Laboratory  is  an  instrument  with  no  parallel  on  the  European 
communitarian aid policies. Though it can be framed within the European aid paradigm, 
it  has  specificities  and  unique  elements.  Therefore,  this  original  experience  could 
configure a test tube for the European Commission, which could be reproduced in other 
contexts and other areas of the world. In this case, this would mean that the Peace 
Laboratory would be not only a laboratory for Colombia, but also for Europe.  
Thus,  one  must  underline  that  whatever  its  impact  in  the  region  and  at  the 
national level is, the Peace Laboratory is on track, oriented to the real problems, to the 
root causes of the conflict and to a negotiated solution. As in a real laboratory, it can 
take time to reach some results, or it may never obtain or reproduce the formula to 
peace. Nevertheless, as John Paul Lederach mentions, “violence is known; peace is the 
mystery. By its very nature, therefore, peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the 
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The Humanitarian Spaces: 
 
La india-ATCC
ALTALA GLORIA: San Pablo, Agua 
dulce, Cuero tendido 





ZONA MINERA: Montecristo, Tiquisio,
Rio Viejo,Arenal,  Morales,





Comunas 4,5,6. Territorios de No 
Violencia
Comuna 7: Ciudadela Educativa 
MICOAHUMADO, ZONA DE 
RESERVA CAMPESINA DE 
MORALES Y ARENAL
SAN PABLO:
Vallecito, Agua linda, El Diamante,
El Paraíso, Alto Cañabraval
VALLE DEL RIO CIMITARRA:
San Pablo, Cantagallo, Yondó





Source: (Rudqvist and Van Sluys, 2005) 
 
 